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THE “SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL POLICY ISSUE”
EXCEPTION TO THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Brent J. Horton*
The business judgment rule is a fixture of corporate law. Under the
business judgment rule, when a shareholder alleges that a corporation’s
board of directors violated its fiduciary duty of care by making an unwise
business decision, the court will dismiss the action. The rule makes sense.
It would be the height of hubris for a judge to, at the behest of a
shareholder, second-guess the wisdom of a board of directors’ decision
(this is especially true when one considers that the vast majority of
judges do not have expertise in business).
The two primary rationales for the business judgment rule are (1)
that directors are business experts (and judges are not), and (2) that
application of the business judgment rule encourages optimal risk taking
by directors.
This Article will demonstrate that those rationales may justify
deference to directors when they make ordinary business decisions;
however, those rationales apply with significantly less force, if at all, to
decisions that implicate a significant social policy issue, such as climate
change, or human rights, among others.
Rather than deference to directors, these are decisions where the
arguments in favor of shareholder input are stronger. After all, as
Professor Bayne wrote in 1957, later quoted by the D.C. Circuit in Medical
Committee for Human Rights, “[a]s much as one may surrender the
immediate disposition of [his money in the form of an investment], he can
never shirk a supervisory and secondary duty (not just a right) to make
sure these goods are used justly, morally and beneficially.”i
Accordingly, this Article argues that there should be a “significant
social policy issue” exception to the business judgment rule. Where a

* Associate Professor and Area Chair, Law & Ethics, Fordham University, Gabelli School
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i David C. Bayne, S.J., The Basic Rationale of Proper Subject, 34 U. DET. L.J. 575, 579
(1957) (quoted by Med. Comm. for Hum. Rts. v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 680 n.31 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972)).
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shareholder challenges a business decision that implicates a significant
social policy issue, rather than applying the business judgment rule and
showing deference to the decision of the board of directors, the court
should apply the intermediate level of enhanced scrutiny. The board
should be required to show (1) it used a reasonable decision-making
process, and (2) it chose from one of several reasonable alternatives. If
the board fails to make the required showing, the court should enjoin the
challenged action.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The business judgment rule bars judicial review of a business
decision made by a corporation’s board of directors.1 The classic
example: in 1916 the Dodge brothers filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin
Ford Motor Company from using a large multi-year surplus ($111.9
million) to expand its manufacturing plant (despite the fact that Ford’s
board of directors already voted for it).2 The Supreme Court of
Michigan refused to enjoin expansion of the plant (and in doing so
reversed an injunction granted by the court below), reasoning that
“judges are not business experts.”3
1 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“It is a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors . . . acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
corporation.”); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (“[D]irectors’
decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack
independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that
cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly
negligent process that includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably
available.”).
2 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 673 (Mich. 1919).
3 Id. at 684. The Supreme Court of Michigan refused to enjoin the construction of
the manufacturing plant but did find that the portion of the additional surplus that was
not used for construction of the plant should be distributed as a dividend. Id. at 685;
see Lide E. Paterno, Irresponsible Corporate-Responsibility Rules, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 499,
527 n.132 (2016) (quoting Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684) (“Even as the Dodge court ordered
Ford to pay dividends, it reversed the trial court’s injunction of the new factory
construction.”). For another classic example of application of the business judgment
rule, see Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (dismissing
disgruntled shareholder’s challenge to the decision of Chicago National League Ball
Club not to install lights at Wrigley Field, causing a loss of revenue from night games).
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Where the board of directors is making an ordinary business
decision, such as the decision to expand the manufacturing plant in
Dodge v. Ford, application of the business judgment rule is appropriate
(because directors have superior expertise, and the court does not
want to stifle risk-taking);4 however, where a board of directors is
making a decision that implicates a significant social policy issue (such
as climate change or human rights), the opposite is true for two
interrelated reasons:
• The expertise rationale for the business judgment rule
applies with significantly less force, if at all, to decisions
that implicate a significant social policy issue. When a
decision implicates a significant social policy issue, the
decision-making process necessarily moves beyond
quantitative methods of analysis with which most
directors are familiar (such as finance), to include
qualitative methods of analysis (such as directors
listening to impacted parties and incorporating what
they hear into the decision-making process).5 I am not
saying that directors are incapable of listening to
impacted parties, or incapable of incorporating what they
hear into the decision-making process; but I am saying

4 For a discussion of optimal risk taking, see infra Section II.D. While beyond the
scope of this Article, some scholars argue that the business judgment rule helps protect
“corporate sovereignty.” See Kenneth B. Davis, Once More, The Business Judgment Rule,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 573, 587–89 (2000). Professor Davis traces the “sovereignty”
rationale for the business judgment rule to section 141 of the General Corporation
Law, that states, “[t]he business and affairs of a corporation . . . shall be managed by . . .
a board of directors.” Id. at 587 n.34 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2020)).
Further, Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge points out that treating the board of
directors like a sovereign is desirable because there must be an ultimate decisionmaker to resolve conflicts between the various constituents of the corporation
(“employees, creditors, equity investors, and other necessary factors of production”),
and the board of directors is best positioned to efficiently do so (consistent with legal
obligations imposed on it by contract, regulation, or statute). See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U.
L. REV. 547, 555–57 (2003) (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68–69
(1974)).
5 Qualitative data collection tools explore impacts that are non-quantifiable, or
difficult to quantify. Such tools may include interviews, focus groups, and document
review. See generally FELICE D. BILLUPS, QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION TOOLS: DESIGN,
DEVELOPMENT, AND APPLICATIONS (2020). While qualitative assessment may involve
looking at impacts on health and the environment, it must be remembered that the
board must do so to meet its fiduciary duty to shareholders. See infra Section IV.B.
That is to say, while stakeholders benefit from such an understanding of the director’s
fiduciary duty, the duty still runs to the shareholders, and only shareholders would
have standing to enforce it. See id.
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that directors do not have any superior expertise in this
area that would justify deferring to their judgment.6
• The optimal risk-taking rationale for the business judgment
rule applies with significantly less force, if at all, to
decisions that implicate a significant social policy issue.
When a decision implicates a significant social policy
issue, the risk moves beyond what can be diversified
away (such as a financial loss), to risks that cannot be
diversified away (such as climate risk, or human rights
risk).7
Given the foregoing, I propose that when a shareholder challenges
a decision that implicates a significant social policy issue, the court
should apply the intermediate standard of enhanced scrutiny.8 To
meet the standard, the board of directors must demonstrate (1) the
reasonableness of “the decisionmaking process employed[,] . . .
including the information on which the directors based their decision;”
and (2) “the reasonableness of the directors’ action in light of the
circumstances then existing.”9 Note that the burden of proof rests first
with the shareholder to show that a significant social policy issue is
implicated, and then shifts to the board of directors.10 If the board fails
to make the required showing, the court should enjoin the challenged
action.11
Application of the intermediate standard of enhanced scrutiny is
appropriate because it still affords some respect to the board of
directors’ decision (as long as the board chose “one of several
reasonable alternatives,” the court should not second-guess the
decision);12 on the other hand, it requires the board of directors to
explain the reasoning for their decision, preventing the board of
directors from hiding behind the business judgment rule when making
a controversial decision that goes beyond ordinary business (such as
decisions that implicate climate change or human rights).13

See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Section IV.D.
8 See infra Part V.
9 See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994).
10 See infra Section V.B.
11 See id.
12 Paramount, 637 A.2d at 45.
13 See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative
Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1458–59
(1991) (“[T]he business judgment rule may be wielded to further broaden directors’
discretion to bypass shareholder input.”).
6
7
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This proposal empowers shareholders to force their way back
into the decision-making process, albeit through litigation.14 This
power is especially important when we consider that shareholders
have been locked out of less “confrontational” means of influencing
corporate behavior, such as the process for nominating directors. (Yes,
it is true that shareholders can vote for directors, but the vote is for a
preordained slate of directors.15
Further, greater shareholder
influence through use of the proxy access rules has been, at best, met
with mixed success.16)
Finally, and importantly, these are decisions (i.e., decisions that
implicate climate change or human rights) where the arguments in
favor of shareholder participation are stronger, and thus eclipse the
situationally undermined arguments in favor of deference to directors.
Where a significant social policy issue is implicated, shareholders have
a right—indeed a duty—to participate in the decision-making
process.17 As Professor David Bayne wrote in 1957, and it still rings
true today, “[a]s much as one may surrender the immediate disposition
of [his money in the form of an investment], he can never shirk a
supervisory and secondary duty (not just a right) to make sure these
goods are used justly, morally, and beneficially.”18
I proceed as follows: Part II explains the business judgment rule.
It discusses three important Delaware cases with an emphasis on the
See infra Part V.
One commentator writes of the problem:
The historical practice in the United States has been for a public
corporation’s board of directors (directly or through a nominating
committee) to nominate candidates for election at an upcoming annual
meeting of shareholders. This exercise rarely augurs change in the
corporation’s business strategies or operations because the nominees
are usually incumbent directors standing for re-election. . . . A mix of
practice and law over the years has relegated a shareholder’s voice in
the election of directors to low decibels. Boards can and often do elicit
input from major shareholders about potential candidates, but are under
no duty to act upon shareholders’ recommendations. Boards are free to
nominate candidates exceeding the number of open seats, but the
practice has been to nominate only the bare minimum, akin to a political
election where only one party nominates candidates.
Eric D. Roiter, Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from Corporate Governance, 6
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 52–53 (2016).
16 See infra Part III; see also John H. Matheson & Vilena Nicolet, Shareholder
Democracy and Special Interest Governance, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1649, 1668–71
(discussing greater shareholder influence via the proxy access rule).
17 Med. Comm. for Hum. Rts. v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 680 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(quoting David C. Bayne, S.J., The Basic Rationale of Proper Subject, 34 U. DET. L.J. 575,
579 (1957)).
18 Bayne, supra note 17, at 579.
14
15

HORTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

10/28/21 4:09 PM

“SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL POLICY ISSUE” EXCEPTION

65

policy rationales the courts consider, such as deference to board of
directors’ expertise, and encouraging optimal risk-taking.19 Part III
lists several types of decisions that implicate significant social policy
issues (these include, but are not limited to, decisions that implicate
climate change and human rights). Part IV explains why the traditional
policy rationales in favor of business judgment deference apply with
significantly less force, if at all, to a board decision that implicates a
significant social policy issue. To illustrate this point, I use a
hypothetical decision. It is a decision that, on its face, implicates the
significant social policy issue of climate change: a utility company is
facing increased demand for electricity; the board of directors must
choose between a new power generation plant that will contribute to
climate change (coal-fired or gas-fired) or one that will not (solar,
wind, or hydroelectric).
Part V sets out my proposal for a significant social policy issue
exception to the business judgment rule: where a board decision
implicates such an issue, the court should apply the intermediate
standard of enhanced scrutiny.
II. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
A. Overview of the Business Judgment Rule
There are many different formulations of the business judgment
rule (and the sections that follow will discuss some of those
variations).20 The purpose of this section, however, is to give the
reader a general understanding of the mechanics of the business
judgment rule and the most salient policy rationales behind it.

19 I chose Delaware because “[t]he Delaware Court of Chancery is a specialized
court of equity with specific jurisdiction over corporate disputes” and is “known
worldwide for its . . . expert and impartial judges that decide its corporate cases.” Why
Businesses Choose Delaware, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corplaw.delaware.gov/whybusinesses-choose-delaware/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2021); see Robert B. Thompson &
Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 165 (2004) (“[Delaware] is the center of shareholder
litigation in this country.”).
20 See Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Law Duty of Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647,
653 (2015) (“[T]he business judgment rule can be understood alternatively as a
presumption, as a differential standard of review, or as a policy of non-review.”); see
also E. Norman Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised
Model Act, the Trans Union Case, and the ALI Project—A Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1483, 1484–87 (1985) (discussing different formulations of the business
judgment rule); S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
93, 102 (1979) (observing that confusion results when courts use different
formulations of the business judgment rule in the same decision).
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The most common understanding of the business judgment rule is
that it operates as a presumption.21 Thus, where a shareholder claims
that a board of directors’ decision violates the fiduciary duty of care,
the court will presume that the board’s decision was proper and
dismiss the action, unless the shareholder overcomes the
presumption.22 The shareholder can overcome the presumption by
showing one of the following: (1) the board of directors acted
fraudulently;23 (2) the board of directors was grossly negligent in the
process it followed to reach the decision, including rushing to reach a
decision,24 or failing to inform itself25 (which is not the same as arguing
that the substance of the decision was grossly negligent); or (3) the
duty of loyalty was implicated.26

Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
See id. Note that a decision is required: “[T]he business judgment rule operates
only in the context of director action. Technically speaking, it has no role where
directors have either abdicated their functions or, absent a conscious decision, failed to
act.” Id. at 813.
23 Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989).
24 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
25 See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (“[T]o invoke the rule’s protection directors have a
duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material
information reasonably available to them.”); see also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM
Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274–75 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that, for protection of
business judgment rule to apply, board must gather and review all relevant
information).
26 The business judgment rule never applies when the fiduciary duty of loyalty is
implicated: self-dealing is a clear example. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business
Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 90 (2004) (“[T]he business
judgment rule has never protected directors who commit fraud or self-dealing.”).
There are decisions, however, that do not rise to the level of self-dealing, but where
business judgment deference is also not appropriate. The court stated in In re Rural
Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig.:
Delaware has three tiers of review for evaluating director decisionmaking: the business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny, and entire
fairness. Enhanced scrutiny is Delaware’s intermediate standard of
review. It applies to specific, recurring, and readily identifiable
situations involving potential conflicts of interest where the realities of
the decision-making context can subtly undermine the decisions of even
independent and disinterested directors. Inherent in these situations
are subtle structural and situational conflicts that do not rise to a level
sufficient to trigger entire fairness review, but also do not comfortably
permit expansive judicial deference.
In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 81–82 (Del. Ch. 2014) (internal
citations omitted).
21
22
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Once the presumption is overcome, the court will generally apply
entire fairness review,27 or in some cases, the intermediate standard of
enhanced scrutiny.28
Like many legal concepts, the business judgment rule is best
understood by reviewing examples of its application. Reviewing those
examples has the added benefit of illuminating the various policy
rationales for the business judgment rule. We will focus on the
business expertise rationale (emphasized by Justice McNeilly’s wellreasoned dissent in Smith v. Van Gorkom),29 and the optimal risk-taking
rationale (emphasized in Brehm v. Eisner30 and Gagliardi v. Trifoods).31
B. Business Expertise and Smith v. Van Gorkom
Smith v. Van Gorkom is perhaps a strange case to use to begin to
explain the business judgment rule.32 That is because Van Gorkom is
the rare case where the business judgment rule failed to protect the
board of directors.33 But what makes this case significant for our
purposes is the stinging dissent, written by Justice McNeilly, where he
calls the majority to task for failing to defer to the expertise of Trans
Union’s Directors.34
The facts of Smith v. Van Gorkom are well-known. Van Gorkom,
late in his tenure as Trans Union’s Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, undertook to sell the company.35 The reason for the sale was
ostensibly36 to solve what Van Gorkom referred to as a “nagging
See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985).
29 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 894–95 (Del. 1985) (McNeilly, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
30 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263.
31 See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996).
32 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858.
33 See id. at 881.
34 See id. at 893–94 (McNeilly, J., dissenting). Justice Christie also dissented, but
explained his dissent in only one paragraph, boiling down to his belief that the board’s
action was protected by the business judgment rule. See id. at 898 (Christie, J.,
dissenting).
35 Id. at 866.
36 I use the term “ostensibly” because it is also possible that Van Gorkom, who was
close to retirement, was motivated by a desire to cash out his shares at a price higher
than the publicly traded price. See id. at 865–66. Of course, that would raise the
possibility that the court was actually treating this as a duty of loyalty case (as opposed
to a duty of care case), despite the statement in the decision that “there were no
allegations of . . . self-dealing, or proof thereof.” Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d. at 873;
Jonathan R. Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights About C.E.O.s, Corporate Law Rules,
and the Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate Charters, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 607, 608
(“The board’s decision was not tainted by even a hint of self-dealing or conflict of
interest. There has never been a serious argument that Smith v. Van Gorkom was a
27
28
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problem” with tax credits.37 Trans Union produced inadequate income
to fully take advantage of investment tax credits to which it was
entitled.38
Van Gorkom, without discussing the matter with the board of
directors, approached corporate takeover specialist, Jay A. Pritzker,
and proposed that one of Pritzker’s companies acquire Trans Union.39
He prepared a presentation, explaining how Pritzker could pay fiftyfive dollars per share and pay off the associated debt within five
years.40 How Van Gorkom arrived at the fifty-five dollars figure is
unclear; the Supreme Court of Delaware stated, “[a]part from the
Company’s historic stock market price, and Van Gorkom’s long
association with Trans Union, the record is devoid of any competent
evidence that $55 represented the per share intrinsic value of the
Company.”41
Thereafter, things moved very quickly.42 The initial meeting
between Van Gorkom and Pritzker took place on September 13,
1980.43 Over the next seven days, Van Gorkom and Pritzker worked
out the details, but there was no further negotiation of the fifty-five
dollars price.44
Van Gorkom called a special meeting of the Trans Union board of
directors for September 20.45 Copies of the proposed merger
agreement were not available for the board to review, and instead, Van
Gorkom gave a twenty-minute oral presentation.46 The entire meeting
lasted a mere two hours.47 At the end of the meeting, the board
approved the proposed merger agreement sight-unseen.48

duty of loyalty case in disguise.”). But see Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate
Fiduciary Model: A Director’s Duty of Independence, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1351, 1354 (1989)
(“Van Gorkom was not . . . a case about the director’s duty of care. Instead, it was one of
a growing number of cases implicating a director’s duty of independence.”).
37 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 865.
38 See id. at 864–65 (explaining that one solution was to make any unused credits
refundable in cash; however, Congress was unwilling to make such a change to the Tax
Code).
39 Id. at 866.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 866–67.
43 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866.
44 See id. at 866–67.
45 Id. at 867.
46 Id. at 868.
47 Id. at 869.
48 Id.
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Plaintiff shareholders brought suit.49 Their complaint alleged that
the board of directors violated their fiduciary duty of care by agreeing
to the merger and undertaking to consummate it.50 Specifically, they
alleged that the board of directors failed to “obtain the requisite
information pertinent to the proposed transaction and failed to weigh
and consider carefully the proposed transaction . . . .”51
The majority agreed.52 While the business judgment rule is a
formidable defense to a fiduciary duty of care claim, it will not protect
a decision that is uninformed or that was reached using a grossly
negligent process.53 The court then found that the board “did not
adequately inform themselves . . . as to the intrinsic value of the
Company” and were “grossly negligent in approving the ‘sale’ of the
Company upon two hours’ consideration, without prior notice, and
without the exigency of a crisis or emergency.”54
The Supreme Court of Delaware remanded the case to the Court of
Chancery to award damages in the amount that the intrinsic value of
Trans Union exceeded fifty-five dollars per share.55 That amounted to
$1.87 per share.56 The result was significant monetary liability for the
individual directors ($23.5 million).57 At the time, commentators
found Smith v. Van Gorkom’s imposition of monetary liability on the
directors for violating their fiduciary duty of care “shocking.”58 The
Delaware legislature too was shocked and effectively overturned the
case with Section 102(b)(7), which provides that, going forward, a
49 See generally Amended Verified Complaint, Smith v. Pritzker, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985) (No. 6342), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6509-a [hereinafter Van
Gorkom Complaint].
50 Id. at 10.
51 Id. at 10–11.
52 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 881.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 874.
55 Id. at 893.
56 Stephen A. Radin, The Director’s Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van
Gorkom., 39 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 719 (1988).
57 Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After
Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 n.* (1985). The original amount plaintiffs claimed was
more than $100 million. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 899.
58 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 56, at 707 (“Three years ago, the Delaware Supreme
Court shocked the corporate world by holding in Smith v. Van Gorkom that a board of
directors had been grossly negligent in approving a cash-out merger proposal . . . .”);
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and
Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 651 (2002) (“People were
shocked by Smith v. Van Gorkom.”); Jonathan Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights
About C.E.O.s, Corporate Law Rules, and The Jurisdictional Competition for Corporate
Charters, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 607, 621 (2002) (“The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in
Smith v. Van Gorkom sent shock waves through the corporate world.”).
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certificate of incorporation may contain a provision eliminating the
personal liability of a director for breach of the fiduciary duty of care.59
As mentioned above, Justice McNeilly wrote a stinging dissent
describing the majority’s opinion as a “comedy of errors.”60 It is that
dissent I would like to focus on now. Justice McNeilly began his dissent
by surgically dismantling the majority’s proffered reason for not
deferring to the Trans Union board’s expertise, i.e., that the Trans
Union board failed to inform itself prior to making the decision.61 This,
he explained, was not the case.62
But more importantly, Justice McNeilly’s dissent acutely focuses
on the business expertise rationale for the business judgment rule.63
He recognizes two sources of expertise: expertise gained through
education and expertise gained through experience.64 As to the Trans
Union directors’ education, he points out that it is unimpeachable.65
They were graduates (or in some cases, professors and deans) at
prestigious business schools, including the College of Commerce and
Business Administration of the University of Illinois UrbanaChampaign (now Gies), the Business School of the University of
Chicago (now Booth), and Harvard Business School.66 As graduates,
59 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2020); see Rock & Wachter, supra note 58, at
663 (discussing 102(b)(7) as a legislative reaction to Smith v. Van Gorkom).
60 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 895.
62 Id. Justice McNeilly further stated, as to the Trans Union board being informed,
by virtue of their position on the board, they already knew most of the information
they needed to judge the proposal:
At the time of the September 20, 1980 meeting the Board was acutely
aware of Trans Union and its prospects. The problems created by
accumulated investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation were
discussed repeatedly at Board meetings, and all of the directors
understood the problem thoroughly. Moreover, at the July, 1980 Board
meeting the directors had reviewed Trans Union’s newly prepared fiveyear forecast, and at the August, 1980 meeting Van Gorkom presented
the results of a comprehensive study of Trans Union made by The
Boston Consulting Group. This study was prepared over an 18 month
period and consisted of a detailed analysis of all Trans Union
subsidiaries, including competitiveness, profitability, cash throw-off,
cash consumption, technical competence and future prospects for
contribution to Trans Union’s combined net income.
Id.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 893–95.
65 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
66 Id. (discussing that Robert Reneker attended Harvard Business School and
University of Chicago Business School; W. Allen Wallis was a professor of economics at
Yale University and former dean of the graduate school of business at the University of
Chicago); see also Snap-On Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A), at 7 (Mar. 9,
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professors, and deans at top-tier business schools, they would have
received training in typical business disciplines, set out in the chart
below.
Chart 1
Typical Director Areas of Education67

Finance

Marketing

Economics

Director
Accounting

Management

Quantitative
Methods

As to the directors’ experience, it too was impressive.68 The five
“inside” directors had a collective sixty-eight years of experience as
directors of Trans Union.69 Van Gorkom is representative. He was
educated as an accountant at the University of Illinois and began his
career at Trans Union in the role of controller.70 Thereafter, he served
as Trans Union’s CEO for eighteen years.71 In addition to his service to
2011) (“Mr. Chelberg earned a Bachelor of Science degree in commerce from the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.”).
67 ASS’N TO ADVANCE COLLEGIATE SCHS. OF BUS. (AACSB) INT’L, 2020 GUIDING PRINCIPLES
AND STANDARDS FOR BUS. ACCREDITATION 38 [hereinafter GUIDING PRINCIPLES].
68 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
69 Id.
70 Terry Wilson, Jerome W. Van Gorkom; Revived Schools’ Finances, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
19, 1998, at 12.
71 Id.

HORTON (DO NOT DELETE)

72

10/28/21 4:09 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:59

Trans Union, he also served on the board of directors of thirteen other
corporations and organizations.72
The five “outside” directors had a collective fifty-three years of
experience as directors of Trans Union.73 Here, Graham Morgan is
representative. He was Chairman and CEO of U.S. Gypsum and helped
shepherd over thirty corporate takeovers in the two decades prior to
the Trans Union transaction.74 Certainly, he had the experience
necessary to evaluate the merger. The other outside directors had
similar experience, as CEOs of I.C. Industries, American Steel, and Swift
and Company.75
Of course, the depth of their experience would not be limited to
corporate takeovers (which is generally considered part of the broader
category of strategic direction). A panoramic view of areas where
these directions would have developed extensive experience76 is set
out in the chart below:

Id.
See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
74 Id.
75 Id. The outside directors also had seventy-eight years of combined experience
as chief executive officers. Id.
76 I list responsibilities that may result in a single act that, in turn, may result in a
lawsuit by a shareholder. I distinguish these responsibilities from the director’s duty
to engage in ongoing day-to-day monitoring. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative
Lit., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996) (discussing directors’ duty to actively monitor). I
also do not include “softer” duties, such as setting the tone at the top. See Mary Jo
White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A Few Things Directors Should Know About the
SEC, Speech Before the Twentieth Annual Stanford Directors’ College (June 23, 2014)
[hereinafter A Few Things] (“Ensuring the right “tone at the top” for a company is a
critical responsibility for each director and the board collectively.”).
72
73
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Chart 2
Typical Director Experience77

These areas of expertise gained through experience—like expertise
gained through education—are predominantly quantitative in nature.
For that reason, the majority’s refusal to defer to the board’s expertise
on a matter that was purely quantitative (i.e., the fair price for Trans
Union shares) was, to Justice McNeilly, indefensible.78
He not-so-subtly reminded the other justices that Trans Union’s
ten directors—not the Supreme Court of Delaware sitting en banc as
some form of “super board of directors”—were the best “qualified” to
decide the proper value of the corporation.79
77 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151, 161 (2020) (power to issue stock); Id. § 243(a)
(power to retire stock); Id. § 170 (power to declare dividends); Id. § 251(b) (power to
approve mergers); Id. § 271 (approve major disposition of assets); Id. § 275 (power to
dissolve corporation); see generally Jill Fisch, Corporate Governance: Taking Boards
Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 272 (1997) (discussing the roll of the board of
directors); PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 314
(1992) (same).
78 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 894–95 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 895 (“These men . . . were more than well qualified to make on the spot
informed business judgments concerning the affairs of Trans Union including a 100%
sale of the corporation.”). Indeed, the willingness of the majority to serve as a “super
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The thrust of Justice McNeilly’s argument is that board expertise
is at its zenith—and should receive deference—when directors are
called upon to make a decision requiring quantitative analysis. The
natural corollary to that argument, of course, is that director expertise
is not at its zenith—and should not be deferred to—when the decision
requires exploring impacts that are non-quantifiable, or difficult to
quantify.80 That is to say, this Article takes the position that where the
decision at hand requires qualitative assessments, the expertise
rationale for deferring to the board of directors will apply with
significantly less force.81
C. Optimal Risk-Taking and Brehm v. Eisner
The next major case in Delaware applying the business judgment
rule was Brehm v. Eisner.82 The background to the case was a tragedy:
The Walt Disney Company lost its president, Frank Wells, in a
helicopter crash in 1994.83 In early 1995, Disney CEO, Michael Eisner,
set out to find a replacement and settled on his longtime friend,
Michael S. Ovitz.84
Ovitz was not an obvious choice.85 He lacked experience
managing a diversified public company like Disney.86 (His primary
qualifications seemed to be his connections developed as an important

board of directors” is somewhat surprising given its reluctance to do so in other
circumstances. See Paul E. Burns, Timing Is Paramount: The Impact of Paramount v.
Time on the Law of Hostile Takeovers, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 761, 793 (1992) (describing
“Delaware judiciary’s . . . struggle . . . to avoid becoming a ‘super board of directors.’”).
80 See generally BILLUPS, supra note 5.
81 A more complete discussion of why decisions that implicate significant social
policy issues (such as climate change or human rights) require qualitative analysis is
discussed in Part IV below.
82 See generally Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
83 See Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to The Business Judgment Rule:
Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 410
(2007) (“Disney’s need for a new president came about when the corporation suffered
several misfortunes. First came the untimely death of its President, Frank Wells, in a
fatal 1994 helicopter crash.”)
84 Despite Eisner’s longtime friendship with Ovitz, the Court did not find that the
fiduciary duty of loyalty was implicated. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business
Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 21
(2005) (“The Eisner-Ovitz relationship, however, falls short of establishing a breach of
the duty of loyalty. Even if one accepts that a personal relationship can disqualify a
director as disinterested, the only member of the Disney board to flunk the test was
Eisner, and none of the usual indicia of ‘domination or control’ were present to suggest
that Eisner’s conflict had spread to the rest of the board.”).
85 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249–50.
86 Id.
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talent broker in Hollywood and Chairman of Creative Artists Agency.87)
Nevertheless, Eisner recommended him, and the Disney board
acquiesced, approving his employment agreement.88
The employment agreement between Disney and Ovitz, in the
words of the Supreme Court of Delaware, was “exceedingly lucrative, if
not luxurious, compared to Ovitz’ value to the Company.”89 The fiveyear contract gave Ovitz a base salary of $1 million, and two sets of
stock options entitling Ovitz to five million Disney shares (worth in
excess of $80 million at the time).90 The stock options were divided
into the “A” options (three million shares); and the “B” options (two
million shares).91
What made the contract “exceedingly lucrative” is that the “A”
options vested immediately in the event of a no-fault termination of
Ovitz.92 In addition to a no-fault termination resulting in the
immediate vesting of the “A” options, it entitled Ovitz to his remaining
salary payments under the five-year agreement, a $10 million
severance payment, and “an additional $7.5 million for each fiscal year
remaining under the agreement.”93
In deciding whether to approve the proposed employment
agreement (which it did on October 1, 1995), the Disney board enlisted
the help of corporate compensation consultant, Graef Crystal.94 He
presumably informed the Disney board of much of the substance set
forth above, however, by his own admission, Mr. Crystal failed to
inform the board regarding “the costs that would be incurred by
Disney in the event Ovitz was terminated from the Company for a
reason other than cause prior to the natural expiration of the Ovitz
Employment Agreement.”95 More specifically, it seems that Mr. Crystal
did not inform the board that Ovitz was actually incentivized “to find a
way to exit the Company via a non-fault termination as soon as
possible because doing so would permit him to earn more than he
could by fulfilling his contract.”96 And in fact, on December 27, 1996, a
mere fifteen months after being hired, when it became apparent that
Id.
Id. at 250.
89 Id. at 249.
90 Id. at 250. The $80 million figure assumes that Disney’s shares were trading
around $17.50 in 1995.
91 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 250.
92 Id. The “B” options were forfeited in the event of a no-fault termination. Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 251.
95 Id.
96 Id.
87
88
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things were not working out between Disney and Ovitz,97 Disney
granted Ovitz a no-fault termination allowing him to walk away with
$140 million.98
The plaintiff’s primary allegation was that the Disney board of
directors violated its fiduciary duty of care by following a grossly
negligent decision-making process and otherwise failing to properly
inform itself when deciding to approve the employment agreement.99
(On its face, the argument that the business judgment rule is overcome
by the board’s failure to inform itself seems promising, especially in
the wake of the earlier Smith v. Van Gorkom case where the Court’s
finding of liability was largely premised on the fact that the board’s
decision was uninformed.100)
The Court began by stating that under the business judgment rule,
where a shareholder claims that a board of directors’ decision violates
the fiduciary duty of care, the court will presume that the board’s
decision was proper and dismiss the action, unless the shareholder
overcomes the presumption.101 The Court further stated (agreeing
with the plaintiffs) that the presumption can indeed be overcome
where the plaintiff shows102 that the board failed to follow a valid
decision-making process, “measured by concepts of gross negligence,
includ[ing] consideration of all material information reasonably
available.”103
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Court found that the board’s
decision-making process was not grossly negligent.104 The board took
months to make the decision105 (not two hours, as was the case in
Smith v. Van Gorkom).106 And during that time, it hired and relied in
97 The allegations contained in the complaint stated that Ovitz exercised an
imperious management style anathema to Disney’s corporate culture, refused to learn
about Disney’s financial affairs, and upon realizing he was failing, spent his time
actively negotiating for an executive position with SONY, as opposed to doing his job at
Disney. See Second Amended Consolidated Derivative Complaint at 27, Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (No. 15452), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/
files/8294-a-hreflivefiles8294-second-amended-complaintpdf.
98 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 252.
99 Id. at 258–60.
100 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 881.
101 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 259.
102 Technically, because Brehm was a derivative lawsuit where no demand was
made, the plaintiffs must raise a “reasonable doubt” that “the challenged transaction
was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.” Id. at 253
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984)).
103 Id. at 259 (emphasis omitted).
104 Id. at 260–62.
105 Id. at 251.
106 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985).
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good faith on the expert advice of Mr. Crystal (this would be akin to a
board getting a fairness opinion in the mergers and acquisitions
context).107 With no lack of irony, it is Mr. Crystal’s later public
comments about the failures of that process that form the basis of
many of the factual allegations in the complaint, that are recounted
above.108
As a fallback argument, the plaintiffs alleged that the substance of
the employment contract itself evidenced gross negligence, which it
characterized as a violation of “substantive due care” (as opposed to
process due care).109 The Court quickly disposed of that claim:
As for the plaintiffs’ contention that the directors failed to
exercise “substantive due care,” we should note that such a
concept is foreign to the business judgment rule. [Pursuant
to the rule] [c]ourts do not measure, weigh or quantify
directors’ judgments. . . . Irrationality is the outer limit of the
business judgment rule. Irrationality may be the functional
equivalent of the waste test or it may tend to show that the
decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient
of the business judgment rule.110
But what does the Supreme Court of Delaware say in Brehm v.
Eisner about the rationale for the business judgment rule? The Court
says that “[a]ny other rule would deter corporate boards from the
optimal rational acceptance of risk.”111 Interestingly, while Brehm v.
Eisner quotes Lewis v. Vogelstein for the proposition that the business
judgment rule is necessary to encourage the optimal acceptance of
risk, that proposition can also be traced back to Gagliardi v. Trifoods,

Brehm, 746 A.2d at 259. In so holding, the Court emphasized the language of
Section 141(e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law:
A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee
designated by the board of directors, shall, in the performance of such
member’s duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the
records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports
or statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation’s
officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by any
other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are within
such other person’s professional or expert competence and who has
been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.
Id. at 261 n.51 (emphasis omitted) (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e)). The Court
further noted “[t]his protection, however, is not without limitation, as in a case of
corporate waste.” Id.
108 Id. at 251.
109 Id. at 262.
110 Id. at 264.
111 Id. at 263 (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. 1997)).
107
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the next case we will discuss.112 For now, it suffices to say that the
Disney board took a risk in offering a lucrative contract to Ovitz to
entice him away from being Chairman of Creative Artists Agency.113
The upside risk was that Ovitz could bring the same entrepreneurial
drive to Disney that he used to build one of the most formidable talent
agencies in the United States.114 (Apparently that is what Eisner
believed.) Of course, the downside risk was that Ovitz could fail. He
had no experience as the president of a public company.115 If Ovitz
failed, not only would Disney be back at square one, searching for a
president, but also Disney would forfeit much in the way of cash and
stock.116
With the benefit of hindsight, the Disney board’s decision may
seem like it was foolishly risky; nevertheless, the Delaware Supreme
Court found the decision to be protected by the business judgment
rule. I believe the Court did so because a contrary ruling would
discourage both bad (unprofitable) and good (profitable) risk-taking.
And as the Court has stated elsewhere, “[t]he business judgment rule
exists precisely to ensure that directors and managers acting in good
faith may pursue risky strategies that seem to promise great profit.”117

Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 336 (citing Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049,
1052 (1996) (“[T]he first protection against a threat of sub-optimal risk acceptance is
the so-called business judgment rule.”)).
113 The Internal Disney Memo regarding the matter stated “[i]t is necessary and
appropriate to provide [Ovitz] with downside protection and upside opportunity to
compensate to the extent feasible for [the loss of] the very successful business he will
abandon.” Opening Brief of the Walt Disney Co. and the Director Defendants in
Support of Their Motion to Dismiss at 9, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)
(No. 15452), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/8289-a (quoting Internal Disney
Memo dated July 7, 1995). Indeed, the Disney Board feared that absent a lucrative
compensation package, they could not attract Ovitz. Id.
114 Id.
(discussing the need to attract a “highly successful and unique
entrepreneur”).
115 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249.
116 Id. at 250. And of course, forfeiting much cash and stock is exactly what
happened. Ovitz was paid $38,888,230.77 in cash, and stock options worth
$101,000,000.00. Id. at 252–53.
117 Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 193 (Del. Ch.
2006); see Bainbridge, supra note 26 at 110 (The business judgment rule is necessary
to avoid “the risk of stifling innovation and venturesome business activity.”) (quoting
AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 141
(1994)).
112
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D. Optimal Risk-Taking and Gagliardi v. TriFoods
In 1993, it became clear that TriFoods International, Inc. was in
financial trouble and that action was necessary to return the company
to profitability.118 Eugene Gagliardi, the founder and Chairman of the
Board of TriFoods, favored a conservative plan of action; TriFoods’
President, Hart, and the remainder of the board of directors, favored a
more risky plan of action.119 The more risky plan of action involved
taking on a large amount of debt to build and fit-out a new factory to
manufacture the products itself—rather than sub-contracting with a
third party—and the purchase of several new food lines: Steak-umms
and Lloyd’s Ribs.120
The debate regarding the direction of the company became
contentious, and after a power struggle, Gagliardi was ousted from his
position as Chairman of the Board and his employment by TriFoods
was terminated.121
Although he retained his thirteen percent
ownership interest in the company, those shares were insufficient to
influence company direction.122
Gagliardi brought a lawsuit against Hart and the board of
directors for breach of their fiduciary duty of care.123 He alleged that
after his ouster, under their leadership, the business of TriFoods
deteriorated.124 He further alleged, “implementation of [Hart’s and the
board of directors’] grandiose scheme for TriFoods’ future growth . . .
in only eighteen months destroyed TriFoods.”125
Unsurprisingly, Chancellor Allen dismissed the fiduciary duty
action.126 He stated that the board of directors of TriFoods was in a
position where some bet-the-company risk-taking was necessary to
turn around the fortunes of a struggling cash-pressed company.127 He
explained that:
alleg[ing] that a corporation has suffered a loss as a result of
a lawful transaction, within the corporation’s powers,
authorized by a corporate fiduciary acting in a good faith
pursuit of corporate purposes, does not state a claim for
118 See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1053 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(describing the company’s struggles and that it was “cash-pressed”).
119 Id. at 1051.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1050.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1051.
124 Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1051.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1050–51.
127 Id. at 1053.
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relief against that fiduciary no matter how foolish the
investment may appear in retrospect.128
That is true even if the board’s decision was “foolishly risky! stupidly
risky! egregiously risky! — you supply the adverb.”129
What is most instructive about Chancellor Allen’s decision in
Gagliardi v. TriFoods is how deeply he discusses the optimal risk-taking
rationale for the business judgment rule.130 Chancellor Allen’s decision
itself could double as a law review article on the important role the
business judgment rule plays in encouraging optimal risk-taking.131
This optimal risk-taking rationale for the business judgment rule
would later be picked up in Lewis v. Vogelstein and then Brehm v.
Eisner.132
Chancellor Allen’s decision points out that a shareholder prefers
risky projects because the potential gain is high, while the potential
loss is capped.133 Even if the risky project fails and results in the
corporation’s insolvency, the corporate liability shield limits the
shareholder’s loss to her initial investment, no more.134 Second,
because of diversification, the shareholder will make up for that loss
with gains made at other companies.135 This is similar to the viewpoint
of a venture capital firm, which “assumes it will lose its bets on most of
its startups” but make huge returns on the few others.136
Prominent scholarship supports Chancellor Allen’s view.137
Professor Bainbridge suggests that shareholders consent to risk-taking
by directors—and agree to limitations on their ability to bring lawsuits
when such risks turn out badly—precisely because they benefit fully
from the upside risk while limiting their downside risk.138 He states
that if they were able, shareholders would contractually agree “to
refrain from challenging the reasonableness of managerial business
decisions.”139 Because the “practicalities of . . . fluid stock ownership”
Id. at 1052.
Id.
130 Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052–53.
131 Id.
132 See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263; Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 336.
133 Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052; see also Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 111 (“[R]isk
and return are directly proportional.”).
134 Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 111 (“[S]hareholders thus do not put their personal
assets at jeopardy, other than the amount initially invested.”).
135 Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052.
136 Henry T. C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of The Corporate Duty to
Creditors, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1381 (2007).
137 Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 115.
138 Id.
139 Id.
128
129
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preclude this, the business judgment rule intercedes to impliedly
create the contract the parties would otherwise expressly create.140
Broader society too benefits from the corporate risk-taking that
the business judgment rule fosters.141 Alan Palmiter writes, “[l]iability
standards that risk introducing timidity in the boardroom could have
enormous costs . . . to society in general.”142 Professors Hu and
Westbrook list “bet the company” projects that benefited society,
including “Boeing having bet the company on the 707, the first
commercial jet airplane, [and] IBM having . . . spen[t] more than the
cost of the Manhattan Project––to develop the IBM 360.”143
The final point made by Chancellor Allen in Gagliardi v. TriFoods is
that the business judgment rule aligns the risk tolerance of directors
with the risk tolerance of shareholders.144 (The business judgment
rule’s downside risk protection makes it more likely that directors will
take the risk shareholders prefer.145) This is especially necessary
when one considers that, unlike shareholders, directors do not share in
the upside risk (financial benefit). That is because, as the Court of
Chancery points out in Gagliardi v. TriFoods, directors have a relatively
small claim in the residual profits.146
And so, absent the protection of the business judgment rule, the
directors’ share of any downside loss is large, while their share of any
upside gain is small.147 Chancellor Allen explains that “[i]f . . . corporate
directors were to be found liable for a corporate loss from a risky
project on the ground that the investment was too risky . . . their
liability would be joint and several for the whole loss (with I suppose a
right of contribution).”148 In short, absent the protection of the
business judgment rule, directors are heavily disincentivized to take
risk.149

Id.
Hu & Westbrook, supra note 136, at 1380–81.
142 Palmiter, supra note 36, at 1463.
143 Hu & Westbrook, supra note 136, at 1380–81.
144 Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
145 Id.
146 Id.; see also Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 116 (stating “[c]orporate directors of
public companies typically have a very small proportionate ownership interest in their
corporations and little or no incentive compensation. Thus, they enjoy (as residual
owners) only a very small proportion of any ‘upside’ gains earned by the corporation
on risky investment projects.”) (quoting Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052).
147 Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 1052–53.
140
141
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E. Conclusions and More Questions
Conclusion 1. As illustrated in Van Gorkom, the first argument in
favor of the business judgment rule is deference to the board of
directors’ business expertise.150
This argument is especially
compelling when the directors are valuing a company for sale, as was
the case in Van Gorkom.151
Related Question 1. Shareholders may be willing to defer to
director decisions where they have special expertise—such as valuing
a company for sale—but are they willing to defer in areas where
directors do not have special expertise, such as climate change or
human rights?
Conclusion 2. As illustrated in Brehm and Gagliardi, the second
argument in favor of the business judgment rule is that it allows
directors broad latitude to take risks.152 The argument is especially
compelling when the downside risk is purely financial, and the possible
negative impact is limited and can be diversified away.153
Related Question 2. Shareholders may prefer risk-taking when it
comes to decisions that present purely financial downside risk, and the
possible negative impact is limited and can be diversified away. But do
shareholders prefer risk-taking when it comes to decisions that
implicate their own health and safety? What if the risk-taking
implicates third-party health and safety?
III. SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL POLICY ISSUES
In a subsequent part, I will argue that, while the business
judgment rule should shield from scrutiny ordinary business decisions,
the business judgment rule should not shield from scrutiny decisions
that implicate significant social policy issues. That begs a fundamental
question: what is a “significant social policy issue?” Fortunately, here,
we do not need to reinvent the wheel. In this part, I will explore the
definition of “significant social policy issue” used by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
First, one point of clarification: I am not proposing that federal
law should control state law on this matter. I am simply suggesting
150 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 894–895 (Del. 1985) (McNeilly, J.,
dissenting).
151 Id. at 895 (“These men knew Trans Union like the back of their hands and were
more than well qualified to make on the spot informed business judgments concerning
the affairs of Trans Union including a 100% sale of the corporation.”).
152 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein,
699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. 1997)); Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052.
153 Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052.
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that the former can inform the latter. This is not unlike how state law
has informed interpretations of federal securities law (albeit in
reverse).154
A. “Significant Social Policy Issues” for Purposes of the Ordinary
Business Operations Exclusion
To unpack the SEC’s definition of “significant social policy issue,”
one has to briefly examine the operation of the federal rule governing
shareholder proposals, Exchange Act Rule 14a-8.155 Promulgated by
the SEC, the main thrust of 14a-8 is that, when a shareholder submits a
proposal,156 the corporation must include that proposal in their proxy
materials and allow it to be voted on at their annual meeting, unless
there is a valid reason to exclude it.157 One valid reason to exclude a
shareholder proposal is that it intrudes on the ordinary business
operations of the corporation. This is referred to as the “ordinary
business operations exclusion.”158
The ordinary business operations exclusion is silent as to whether
it has any exceptions.159 The exclusion language is short and cryptic:
exclusion is appropriate “[i]f the proposal deals with a matter relating
to the company’s ordinary business operations.”160 That is it. Nothing
more.
The SEC, however, has made clear that the exclusion may not be
applied to a proposal—even one that intrudes on ordinary business
operations—if it also raises a significant social policy issue that
transcends the protection afforded by the ordinary business
operations exclusion (that is to say, the exclusion has an exception).161
Courts have referred to such proposals as “transcend[ing] . . . ordinary
154 For example, the federal interpretation of “investment contract” is borrowed
from state “blue sky” laws. See SEC v. W.J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
155 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
156 A “shareholder proposal” is a “proposed course of action that [the presenting
shareholder] believe[s] the company should follow.” Id. § 240.14a-8(a).
157 Id. § 240.14a-8(g). The burden is on the company to demonstrate that exclusion
is appropriate. Id.
158 Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(7).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders,
Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, 1976 SEC LEXIS 326, *31–32 (Nov. 22, 1976)
[hereinafter 1976 Adopting Release] (stating that the exclusion should not be applied
to matters that have “significant policy . . . implications inherent in them”);
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093,
1997 SEC LEXIS 1962, *49–50 (Sept. 26, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Proposing Release]
(stating that the exclusion should not apply to “proposals . . . focusing on significant
social policy issues”).
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business operations.”162 The rule, exclusion, and exception to the
exclusion, can be visualized as follows:
Chart 3
The Significant Social Policy Issue Exception
Rule 14a-8 requires that
shareholder proposals be
included in the corporate
proxy for vote at the annual
meeting.

Rule 14a-8(i)(7) allows
exclusion of the proposal
where it "deals with a matter
relating to the company’s
ordinary business operations.”

But the shareholder proposal
cannot be excluded if it raises
a significant social policy issue
that transcends ordinary
business.

The SEC issues formal interpretive guidance (“Releases”) that we
can use to further our understanding of the significant social policy
exception to the ordinary business operations exclusion.163 Consider
the following releases (these releases are important because, absent
regulatory text, they are the first place bench and bar look for
guidance):
• 1976 Release. The SEC stated that going forward the
ordinary business operations exclusion may not be used
to exclude “matters which have significant policy . . .
implications inherent in them.” It provided the following
example: “a proposal that a utility company not construct
a proposed nuclear power plant.”164
• 1997 Release. The SEC reaffirmed that going forward the
ordinary business operations exclusion may not be used
to exclude matters that “raise[] significant social policy

162
163
164

Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323, 345 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 337.
1976 Adopting Release, supra note 161, at *31–32.
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issues.”165 This would allow, for instance, a proposal to
“expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.”166
In addition to Releases, the SEC issues no-action letters written by
attorneys employed in its Division of Corporate Finance (“SEC
Staff”).167 The SEC explains no-action letters as follows:
[A person] who is not certain whether a particular . . . action
would constitute a violation of the federal securities law may
request a “no-action” letter from the SEC staff . . . . [I]f the
staff grants the request for no action [the letter will state]
that the SEC staff would not recommend that the Commission
take enforcement action against the requester based on the
facts and representations described in the [person’s]
request.168
The SEC also writes, “[m]ost no-action letters describe the request,
analyze the particular facts and circumstances involved, [and] discuss
applicable laws and rules . . . .”169 Unfortunately, the last two features
are regularly absent from no-action letters regarding exclusion of
shareholder proposals.170 Most no-action letters simply states whether
they concur (or do not concur) with the company’s grounds for

165 1997 Proposing Release, supra note 161, at *41–50. The SEC proposed reversing
a controversial SEC no-action letter that stated: “[T]he fact that a shareholder proposal
concerning a company’s employment policies and practices for the general workforce
is tied to a social issue will no longer be viewed as removing the proposal from the
realm of ordinary business operations of the registrant.” Id. at *43–44. After
comment, it adopted the proposal six months later. See Amendments To Rules On
Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40018, 1998 SEC LEXIS 1001, *15
(May 21, 1998) (“We are adopting our proposal to reverse the Cracker Barrel position,
which provided that all employment-related shareholder proposals raising social
policy issues would be excludable under the ‘ordinary business’ exclusion.”); see also
Selected Labor and Employment Law Updates, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 789, 790–91
(1998) (“Proposals relating to ‘ordinary business’ subject matters such as
employment, but focusing on sufficiently significant social policy issues (e.g.,
discrimination), would transcend the day-to-day business matters and raise policy
issues appropriate for a shareholder vote.”).
166 See N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1995) (containing language
of proposal).
167 See Trinity, 792 F.3d at 330–31 (discussing how the no-action letter process
applies in the context of Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals).
168 No Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.investor.gov/
introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/no-action-letters (last visited Feb.
10, 2021).
169 Id.
170 See Reilly S. Steel, The Underground Rulification of The Ordinary Business
Operations Exclusion, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1547, 1549 (2016) (explaining that no-action
letters are devoid of the staff’s reasoning).
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exclusion.171 Nevertheless, even if detailed reasoning is absent, we can
identify categories of proposals that the SEC believes implicate
transcendent significant social issues—and thus, should not be
excluded—including, but not limited to, climate change and human
rights.172
B. Climate Change
The 1997 Release, discussed above, made clear that building a
nuclear power plant is a decision that implicates significant social
policy issues.173 There, the significant social policy issue was the safety
concern that a nuclear power plant poses.174 The next logical question
is: does building a power generation plant that uses other kinds of fuel,
likewise, implicate significant social policy issues? In 2011, the SEC
Staff implied that it did—at least where its construction could
contribute to climate change (which is the case for coal-fired and gasfired power generation plants).175 At issue was a shareholder proposal

171 Id. In fairness, there is some helpful language from the SEC itself indicating that
a significant social policy issue is one that is a “consistent topic of widespread public
debate.” Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No.
40,018, 1998 SEC LEXIS 1001, *17 (May 21, 1998); see SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14A,
2002 SEC No-Act LEXIS 638, *4 (July 12, 2002) (“[T]he presence of widespread public
debate regarding an issue is among the factors to be considered in determining
whether proposals concerning that issue ‘transcend the day-to-day business
matters.’”) (internal citation omitted).
172 See Trinity, 792 F.3d at 342–43 (using no-action letters to determine the
boundaries of the exclusion); Steel, supra note 170, at 1549 (describing how no-action
letters are imperfect tools for determining the contours of the ordinary business
operations exclusion).
173 1976 Adopting Release, supra note 161, at *31–32; see Northern States Power
Co., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 168, at *1 (Feb. 9, 1998)
(denying no-action relief for proposal encouraging company to convert a nuclear
power plant into a natural gas plant). Further, the SEC used similar reasoning to refuse
to grant no-action relief where shareholders submitted a proposal asking for a report
on the safety of a nuclear power plant, finding that the subject of the safety of nuclear
power transcends ordinary business. See Florida Progress Corp., SEC Staff No-Action
Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 87, *2 (Jan. 26, 1993) (denying no-action relief for
proposal requesting a special report on the operation and safety of a nuclear power
plant); see also Burlington Northern, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1759, at *1 (Feb. 19, 1985) (denying no-action relief where shareholders sought
report regarding transportation of nuclear materials).
174 1976 Adopting Release, supra note 161, at *31–32.
175 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENV’T BASELINE, VOLUME 1: GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM THE
U.S. POWER SECTOR 4 (2016) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENT BASELINE] (breaking down carbon
dioxide emissions by power plant type).
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that asked Dominion Resources to “invest in demand control and new
renewable generation sources.”176
The SEC took the position that the proposal should not be
excluded, stating that “the determination whether to . . . develop[]
renewable energy generating systems [is a] significant policy
issue[].”177 This is not surprising, as climate change, and the significant
role played by the energy sector, has generated widespread public
debate over the past three decades.178 The debate has shifted back and
forth, and then back again. The United States signed onto the Kyoto
Protocol in 1997 and then withdrew in 2001;179 the United States
signed onto the Paris Agreement in 2015, then withdrew in 2020,180
and then rejoined in 2021.181
In a separate matter, the SEC Staff took the position that a
shareholder proposal requesting a report explaining how an energy
company’s business will be impacted by climate change is not
excludable.182 The SEC Staff reasoned that the proposal is not

Dominion Resources, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2011 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
131, *5, *7 (Feb. 9, 2011). The entire proposal was actually quite broad, and included
discouraging nuclear power plant construction:
RESOLVED, that the shareholders of Dominion Resources urge the Board
of Directors to: be open and honest with us about the enormous costs
and risks of new nuclear construction; invest in demand control and new
renewable generation sources for the safest and quickest returns to
shareholders, stakeholders, community and country; and therefore, stop
wasting shareholder money by pursuing the increasingly costly and
unnecessary risky venture of a new nuclear unit.
Id. at *7.
177 Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
178 Nathaniel Rich, The Next Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 14, 2019)
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/09/magazine/climate-changecapitalism.html (describing the decades long debate over climate change).
179 Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate Change, U.S. Domestic Regulation and the Future of
the Car: Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in Environmental Law, 17
N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 210, 249 (2008).
180 Lisa Friedman & Somini Sengupta, Despite U.S. Exit, World Moves Ahead on
Climate Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2020, at A10. While President Trump broadcasted his
intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement in 2016, the United States could not
legally withdraw until 2020. Marc Zemel, The Rise of Rights-Based Climate Litigation
and Germany’s Susceptibility to Suit, 29 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 484, 486 (2018).
181 Paris Climate Agreement, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/paris-climateagreement/.
182 Devon Corp., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2014 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 271, at *1–2
(Mar. 19, 2014). The text of the proposal was:
Resolved: Shareholders request that Devon prepare a report by October
2014, omitting proprietary information and prepared at reasonable cost,
on the company’s goals and plans to address global concerns regarding
176
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excludable because it “focuses on the significant policy issue of climate
change.”183
C. Human Rights
Generally, the position of the SEC Staff is that shareholder
proposals involving human rights implicate a significant social policy
issue.184 But there are many categories here. I will focus on two:
human rights problems in the supply chain (usually in the form of
suppliers using forced- or child-labor), and actions that infringe on free
speech and free association.
Nucor Corporation is a steel producer, a component of which is
pig iron.185 The company faced scrutiny in 2006 when the financial
press revealed that Nucor was purchasing pig iron produced using
forced labor.186 Shareholders were rightly concerned. They brought a
shareholder proposal asking the directors to formally adopt supply
chain policies designed to prevent such occurrences from happening in
the future.187 Nucor sought to exclude the shareholders’ human rights
proposal on the basis that it dealt with management and retention of
suppliers, and thus interfered with ordinary business operations.188

the contribution of fossil fuel use to climate change, including analysis of
long and short term financial and operational risks to the company.
Id. at *28.
183 Id. at *1–2; see Hess Corp., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2016 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
171, at *1 (Feb. 29, 2016) (denying no-action relief because “the proposal focuses on
the significant policy issue of climate change”). But where the shareholder proposal
goes beyond requesting that the directors develop a plan of action, the SEC has been
less willing to require its inclusion in the proxy materials. See Exon Mobil Corp., SEC
Staff No-Action Letter, 2019 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 215, at *1–2 (Apr. 2, 2019) (allowing
proposal to be excluded because it required the company to set actual targets, and as
such, micromanages the Company).
184 Brent J. Horton, Malign Manipulations: Can Google’s Shareholders Save
Democracy?, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 707, 751–52 (2019).
185 Michael Smith & David Voreacos, The Secret World of Modern Slavery, BLOOMBERG
MKTS., Dec. 2006, at 48.
186 Id. at 48. The forced labor produces the charcoal in the forests of Brazil, which is
then used to produce the pig iron. Id.
187 Nucor Corp., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2008 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 372, at *4–5
(Mar. 6, 2008). The actual proposal read:
Shareholders request the Board of Directors to review the company’s
policies and practices related to its global operations and supply chain to
assess areas where the company needs to adopt and implement
additional policies to ensure the protection of fundamental human rights
and to report its findings to shareholders, omitting proprietary
information and at reasonable expense, by October 2008.
Id.
188 Id. at *5.
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The SEC Staff took the position that Nucor should include the
proposal in its proxy materials and allow it to go to a shareholder
vote.189 While the SEC Staff provided no reasoning for its position, it is
worth noting that the proponents emphasized that a proposal must be
included in proxy materials if it implicates a significant social policy
issue (and this is a position that the SEC Staff, by denying Nucor’s
request for no-action relief, apparently agreed with).190 The outcome
is not surprising. Forced labor in supply chains has been, and
continues to be, a source of widespread public debate.191
Abercrombie & Fitch (“A&F”) is a clothes retailer that sources
much of its merchandise in Asia and South America.192 It faced
negative press when it settled a lawsuit brought by workers “who
alleged they were mistreated while they worked for [one of A&F’s]
vendors.”193 The shareholder proposal in question required that A&F
adopt and enforce a vendor code of conduct to protect the human
rights of those workers.194 The SEC Staff took the position that the
proposal should be included in the company’s proxy materials because
human rights is a significant social policy issue.195 Indeed, forced labor
in the fashion industry is a matter of constant discussion in the press196
and academia.197

Id. at *1.
Id. at *5–6.
191 See Ana Swanson & Chris Buckley, Chinese Solar Companies Tied to Use of Forced
Labor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/business/
economy/china-solar-companies-forced-labor-xinjiang.html.
192 Abercrombie & Fitch Co., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2010 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
373, at *10 (Apr. 12, 2010).
193 Id. at *11.
194 Id. at *12.
195 Id. at *1–2. The SEC seems willing to allow shareholder proposals that require
corporations to prepare reports or implement policies to protect human rights in the
supply chain; but where the proposal goes further, and threatens a specific product
(that is to say, proposes altering the company’s “product mix”), the SEC is more likely
to allow it to be excluded. For example, the SEC allowed Amazon (the owner of Whole
Foods) to exclude a shareholder proposal aimed at stopping Whole Foods from selling
shrimp produced with child labor because SEC staff viewed the proposal as seeking to
“micromanage” the company’s choice of what products to sell. See Amazon.com, Inc.,
SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2019 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 261, at *1 (Apr. 3, 2019).
196 See Elizabeth Paton, Close Look at a Fashion Supply Chain is Not Pretty, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2020, at D.4 (discussing forced-labor in the fashion supply chain); see Leslie P.
Norton, Investing in China Isn’t Easy. Focusing on ESG Can Help., BARRON’S (Jan. 25,
2021), https://www.barrons.com/articles/investing-in-china-isnt-easy-focusing-onesg-can-help-51611309600 (discussing that H&M stores cut ties with a supplier said to
have been using forced labor).
197 See Lisa Bollinger Gehman, Achieving Transparency: Use of Certification Marks to
Clean up the Fashion Industry’s Supply Chains, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 161, 168 (2016)
189
190
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Shareholder proposals opposing corporate stifling of free speech
are usually not excludable.198 Apple came under increased scrutiny for
being complicit in China’s censorship of its own citizens.199
Specifically, Apple removed anti-censorship tools from its App Store in
China.200 It had also (in)famously removed the New York Times app
from its App Store in China after being pressured by Beijing.201
When an Apple shareholder, upset by these occurrences,
submitted for vote at the annual meeting a proposal that required
Apple to set up a human rights committee, the SEC held that the
company could not exclude the proposal because it dealt with a matter
of ethical and social significance.202 In refusing to allow the proposal to
be excluded, the SEC staff reasoned that Apple admitted that “the
Board and management firmly believe that human rights are an
integral component of the Company’s business operations,” and utterly
failed to “explain why this particular proposal would not raise a
significant issue for the Company.”203
A similar shareholder proposal submitted at Yahoo! was also not
excludable.204 The proposal required that Yahoo! adopt the following
human rights principles:
No information technology products or technologies will be
sold, and no assistance will be provided to authorities in
(“Common problems in the fashion industry’s supply chains include child labor, forced
labor, sweatshops, and unsafe manufacturing facilities.”).
198 See, e.g., Apple, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2017 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 382, *1–
2 (Nov. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Apple No-Action Letter]; Yahoo! Inc., SEC Staff NoAction Letter, 2011 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 363, *2 (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Yahoo! NoAction Letter].
199 Katie Benner & Wee Sui-Lee, Apple Removes New York Times News Apps from its
Chinese Store, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2017, at B.1.
200 Paul Mozur, Joining Apple, Amazon’s China Cloud Service Bows to Censors, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/business/amazonchina-internet-censors-apple.html (“Days after Apple yanked anti-censorship tools off
its app store in China, another major American technology company is moving to
implement the country’s tough restrictions on online content.”).
201 Benner & Sui-Lee, supra note 199, at B.1.
202 Apple No-Action Letter, supra note 198, at *1–2.
203 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
As to the second comment, it is an
understatement. As I have discussed elsewhere:
In an oddly out-of-touch rebuttal to Mr. Zhao, Apple’s attorneys spent
many pages of its letter to the SEC Staff explaining that human rights is a
day-to-day management concern at Apple, but focused on how Apple
furthers human rights through environmental protection. Apple never
discussed how fighting government censorship is a day-to-day
management concern (perhaps because they could not).
Horton, supra note 184, at 751–52.
204 Yahoo! No-Action Letter, supra note 198, at *1–2.
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China and other repressive countries that could contribute to
human rights abuses. No user information will be provided,
and no technological assistance will be made available, that
would place individuals at risk of persecution based on their
access or use of the Internet or electronic communications
for free speech and free association purposes.205
The SEC Staff refused to concur that it could be excluded, because it
“focuses on the significant policy issue of human rights.”206
D. Indiscriminate Weapons
Weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have
indiscriminate effects (“indiscriminate weapons”) are not illegal per se,
and thus they can be manufactured, although doing so obviously
implicates significant social policy issues.207 Indiscriminate weapons
include napalm (which causes horrific burns) and cluster munitions
(which kill indiscriminately, even after the end of the conflict).208 The
landmark case here is Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC.209
That case involved the Medical Committee for Human Rights (“Medical
Committee”), which had received several shares of Dow Chemical,
submitting the following shareholder proposal:
RESOLVED, that the shareholders of the Dow Chemical
Company request the Board of Directors [amend the]
Certificate of Incorporation of the Dow Chemical Company
[to provide] that napalm shall not be sold to any buyer unless
that buyer gives reasonable assurance that the substance will
not be used on or against human beings.210
The Medical Committee gave the following reasons in support of the
proposal:
[W]e wish to note that our objections to the sale of this
product [are] primarily based on the concerns for human life
inherent in our organization’s credo. However, we are
further informed by our investment advisers that this
product is also bad for our company’s business as it is being
used in the Vietnamese War. It is now clear from company
statements and press reports that it is increasingly hard to

Id. at *6.
Id. at *2.
207 W. Hays Parks, Means and Methods of Warfare, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 511,
518–19 (2006).
208 Id. at *523.
209 See Med. Comm. for Hum. Rts. v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as
moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
210 Id. at 662.
205
206
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recruit the highly intelligent, well-motivated, young college
men so important for company growth. There is, as well, an
adverse impact on our global business, which our advisers
indicate, suffers as a result of the public reaction to this
product.211
Dow sought to exclude the proposal as interfering with its ordinary
business operations, and the SEC acquiesced, granting no-action
relief.212 Thereafter, the Medical Committee sought review of the SEC’s
decision.
The D.C. Circuit Court found serious problems with the SEC
decision, finding that the SEC acquiesced in a “very dubious legal
theory.”213 Specifically, the Court said it could find no detailed
discussion in the record of why the proposal interfered with ordinary
business operations (interestingly, the Court stated that such an
argument would need to be premised on what ordinary business
operations means for purposes of state law).214
Further, the Court emphasized that the proposal raised a
significant social policy issue. The Court stated:
management may [not] properly place obstacles in the path
of shareholders who wish to present to their co-owners . . .
the question of whether they wish to have their assets used
in a manner which they believe to be more socially
responsible but possibly less profitable than that which is
dictated by present company policy.215
Following that language, which commentators have stated (and I
agree) “strongly suggested the proposal was indeed eligible under rule
14a-8[,]”216 the Court remanded the matter to the SEC to make a more
“enlightened determination of whether enforcement action would be
appropriate.”217
At that point Dow saw the writing on the wall. In January 1971,
the Medical Committee again submitted its napalm resolution for
inclusion in Dow’s 1971 proxy statement. This time, Dow acquiesced
and included the proposal in its proxy materials.218

Id.
Id. at 663.
213 Id. at 674–75.
214 Id. at 680.
215 Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 681 (emphasis added).
216 Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate
Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 111 n.53 (1988).
217 Med. Comm., 432 F.2d at 672.
218 SEC v. Med. Comm. for Hum. Rts., 404 U.S. 403, 405–06 (1972).
211
212
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Since that time, matters involving indiscriminate weapons have
generally been includable in proxy statements because they raise a
significant social policy issue.219 In 1988, Honeywell came under
scrutiny from its investors, who were troubled by claims “that cluster
bombs made by Honeywell ‘lie unexploded in Lebanon and Southeast
Asia, waiting to maim curious schoolchildren . . . .’”220
The
shareholders were concerned that, regardless of the truth of the
accusations, “the Company is the target of at least two public
vilification and pillory campaigns which could impact its public
relations, its ability to recruit engineers and executives[,] and its ability
to market its products.”221 The Marianist Society and other religious
groups owning shares in Honeywell submitted a shareholder proposal
asking the company to submit a plan for diversifying its manufacturing
away from, inter alia, cluster munitions (and toward the manufacture
of civilian products).222 Honeywell sought to exclude the proposal as
relating to ordinary business operations.223 The SEC Staff refused
Honeywell’s request for no-action relief and took the position that the
proposal could not be excluded.224
IV. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE SHOULD NOT APPLY TO DECISIONS THAT
IMPLICATE A SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL POLICY ISSUE
Here, I will explain why the business judgment rule should not
apply to decisions that implicate the significant social policy issues
highlighted in Part III. To help illustrate my point, I will use the
hypothetical of a board’s decision to build a power generation plant,
which implicates the significant social policy issue of climate change
(please note that the same arguments would apply, albeit with some
See Honeywell, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 247, *1
(Feb. 24, 1988) [hereinafter Honeywell No-Action Letter] (denying no-action relief to
Honeywell, Inc.); see also General Electric, SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2001 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 62, *1–2 (Jan. 16, 2001) [hereinafter GE No-Action Letter]. This is an interesting
matter where GE tried to exclude such a proposal as substantially implemented and
did not even try to argue it interfered with ordinary business operations.
220 Honeywell No-Action Letter, supra note 219, at *20–21.
221 Id. at *21.
222 Id. at *2, *20–21.
223 Id. at *2–3.
224 Id. at *1. An interesting note, in 2001, General Electric received the following
proposal from shareholders: “RESOLVED that the shareholders request GE
management to establish a firm policy to renounce future involvement in . . . cluster
bomb production.” GE No-Action Letter, supra note 219, at *2. GE tried to argue that it
should be excluded as substantially implemented (14a-8(i)(10)) because “GE does not
make landmines or cluster bombs, nor does it make parts or components of landmines
or cluster bombs.” Id. The SEC Staff disagreed and required that the proposal be
included. Id. at *1.
219
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modification, to decisions that implicate other significant social policy
issues, such as human rights).
Imagine a situation where the board of directors of a utility
company must decide what kind of power generation plant to build.
The board is free to choose among the available alternatives: retaining
the status quo (no new plant); coal-fired or natural gas-fired (which
would contribute to climate change); or solar, wind, or hydroelectric
(which would not contribute to climate change).225 Now assume that
after deliberation, the directors decide to construct a new coal-fired
power generation plant.
Thereafter, a group of shareholders seek an injunction. They
claim that the board of directors violated its fiduciary duty of care.226
Such an action would almost certainly be dismissed under the
business judgment rule. The decision to expand or build a new power
generation plant is a quintessential business judgment.227 A close
analogy would be the important case of Dodge v. Ford, where the
Michigan Supreme Court held that the board’s decision to use its
extraordinary cash surplus to expand its manufacturing plant was an

225 See ENVIRONMENT BASELINE, supra note 175, at 4 (breaking down carbon dioxide
emissions by power plant type).
226 While I am unaware of any such cases in the United States, such a case was
recently filed in Poland. See Alice Garton, Marcin Stoczkiewicz & Peter Barnett,
Briefing, Ostrołęka C: Energa’s and Enea’s Board Members’ Fiduciary Duties to the
Companies and Shareholders, CLIENTEARTH (Sept. 20, 2018), http://
blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/
non-us-case-documents/2018/20180920_Not-Available_na-1.pdf.
227 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (refusing to enjoin
construction of plant); Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of Control: Toward a
Theory of Takeover Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103, 162 (2003) (“[The decision to] build a new
factory or enter into a new line of business . . . falls squarely within the board’s
control.”); Thomas Joo, Global Warming and the Management-Centered Corporation, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 680 (2009) (“Regardless of whether it would be a poor
business judgment to forego the ‘green’ market, it would nonetheless be a business
judgment and as such it would not be actionable by shareholders under state
corporation law.”). Also, consider the analogous situation of a nuclear power plant.
While there have been no shareholder lawsuits challenging the construction of nuclear
power plants in the United States, there is little doubt that any such challenge would
fail under the current articulation of the business judgment rule. Professor Ramseyer
points out that when such lawsuits were commenced in Japan (where there is a long
history of opposition to nuclear power), those lawsuits have been dismissed under the
Japanese equivalent to the business judgment rule. See J. Mark Ramseyer, Nuclear
Power and the Mob: Extortion in Japan, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 487, 500 (2016); see
also Shiro Kawashima & Susumu Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan:
Law, Practice, and Suggested Reforms, 33 STAN. J INT’L L. 9, 43 (1997) (“In Chubu Electric
Power, the shareholders initiated a derivative action to prevent the power company
from constructing a nuclear power plant.”).
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exercise of business judgment that would not be disturbed.228 (True,
the Court also held that the board abused its business judgment when
it did not declare a special dividend, but that was only because not all
of the cash surplus was used to expand its manufacturing plant.229)
We must remember, however, that “the ‘business judgment’ rule
is a judicial creation,”230 and each exception to the business judgment
rule is likewise a judicial creation.231 It would be entirely proper for a
court to hold that the business judgment rule does not shield the
decision of the board of directors where it implicates a significant
social policy issue based on two interrelated arguments:
Argument 1. Shareholder expectations define the “ends” of the
fiduciary duty of care. For regular decisions (those that do not
implicate a significant social policy issue), shareholders expect
directors to choose the course of action that maximizes financial
return. For decisions that do implicate a significant social policy issue
(such as (1) the environment and/or (2) human rights), the “ends” will
be more nuanced. (For example, shareholders may expect that
directors maximize financial return, but not at the expense of (1) the
environmental and/or (2) human rights.232)
Argument 2. If the “ends” of the fiduciary duty of care are more
nuanced (i.e., shareholders expect that directors do more than look
beyond maximization of returns), then it is not appropriate to apply
the business judgment rule because (1) directors do not have special
expertise regarding all of the “ends” implicated,233 and (2)

Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
Id. at 685 (finding the refusal to declare a dividend an abuse of discretion).
230 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981).
231 Shaunna L. Wollpert, MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio Inc.: Determination of
the Review Standard When Directors’ Defensive Measure Impedes Shareholders’ Right to
Vote, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 175, 182 (2004) (“Despite the business judgment rule’s
evidentiary burden on the moving party, the protections of the business judgment rule
are not absolute, and there are some court-created exceptions to the general rule.”).
232 See infra Section IV.A. Interestingly, one could argue that there is no conflict
between maximizing profits and avoiding harm to the environment (or, for that
matter, avoiding human rights abuses). See David B. Spence, Corporate Social
Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Industry: The Importance of Reputational Risk, 86 CHI.KENT L. REV. 59, 68 (2011) (“Customers may be willing to pay a premium for ‘green’
electricity or oil that comes from a relatively green oil company . . . .”); Truzaar Dordi &
Olaf Weber, The Impact of Divestment Announcements on the Share Price of Fossil Fuel
Stocks, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 3122, 3123 (2019) (suggesting reputational harm would
place downward pressure on their share price).
233 See infra Section IV.C.
228
229
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shareholders cannot diversify away the risk of environmental harm or
human rights harm.234
A. Shareholder Expectations Define The “Ends” Of The Fiduciary
Duty Of Care
The generally accepted version of the fiduciary duty of care
requires that directors use appropriate means (e.g., fully informing
themselves prior to making the decision) toward accepted ends (e.g.,
maximizing return to shareholders).235 If the accepted end in this
means-ends analysis is maximizing return to shareholders, then
business judgment rule deference makes sense. After all, as discussed
in Part II, directors are uniquely equipped to assess which course of
action will maximize returns to shareholders.
However, the foregoing begs a fundamental question: why is
maximizing return to shareholders the accepted end? The most likely
explanation is that because shareholders invest to make money. As
stated in Dodge v. Ford, maximizing returns to shareholders is
consistent with those shareholders’ “just expectations.”236 Specifically,
in that case, the Dodge brothers “expect[ed] to obtain the profits of
their investment in the form of regular dividends.”237 Ford’s board of
directors violated that expectation—and it follows, their fiduciary duty
of care—when they decided not to declare a dividend, but instead use
the profits to subsidize the price of automobiles (in the words of Henry
Ford, “to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest
possible number . . . .”).238
The same idea—that shareholder expectations set the proper
ends for purposes of our means-ends analysis—is reflected in later
work by Berle and Means.239 In their landmark book, The Modern
See infra Section IV.D.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.
The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of
directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end . . . .”).
236 See id. at 682 (withholding a dividend from the shareholders “would defeat their
just expectations” (quoting MORAWETZ ON CORPORATIONS (2d ed.), § 447)); David B.
Guenther, The Strange Case of the Missing Doctrine and the “Odd Exercise” of Ebay: Why
Exactly Must Corporations Maximize Profits to Shareholders?, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 427,
485–86 (2018) (arguing that the Dodge decision was based on the court’s
understanding of shareholder expectations).
237 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 682.
238 Id. at 683.
239 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 243–44, 246–47 (1932); see William W. Bratton, Berle and Means
Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 763 (2001) (explaining that Berle
234
235
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Corporation and Private Property, they explain that the corporation is
characterized by owners’ expectation of a financial return.240 Owners
entrust their money to management with the expectation that it will be
used wisely, and dividends will be paid to them.241
From the foregoing, it follows that if shareholders expect wealth
maximization, then wealth maximization is the proper end.242 But it
also follows that if shareholder expectations change or become more
nuanced, so too should the ends that directors pursue.243 I suggest that
shareholder expectations of profits are in fact nuanced; they do not
want profits derived from harming, by way of example, (1) health and
the environment; or (2) human rights.244
Consider the first “nuance” to the general rule that shareholders
want profits—i.e., that shareholders do not want profits derived from
harming health or the environment—as an example. While one can
safely assume that shareholders want a financial return, it is equally
safe to assume that shareholders do not want a financial return at the
expense of their own health. And such an expectation is not solely selfinterested. Such an expectation is also based upon (or at least should
be based upon) avoiding harm to the health of the broader public as
well.
Likewise, human rights. Professor David Bayne, S.J., wrote in
1957, and it still rings true today, “[an investor] never can shirk a
supervisory and secondary duty (not just a right) to make sure [their
investment is] used justly, morally and beneficially.”245 More recently,
and Means discussion of shareholder “expectations of fair dealing . . . went on to serve
for decades as a primary justification for fiduciary duties in corporate legal theory.”).
240 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 239, at 242–44, 246–47.
241 Id.
242 Arthur Acevedo, Responsible Profitability? Not On My Balance Sheet!, 61 CATH. U.
L. REV. 651, 696 (2012) (“[P]rofit maximization . . . is what the law requires and what
shareholders expect.”).
243 I am not the first to suggest that the contours of the fiduciary duty should follow
shareholder expectations. See John C. Carter, The Fiduciary Rights of Shareholders, 29
WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 841 (1988) (When courts apply fiduciary duties, the
“justifiable expectations of the shareholders in a publicly held corporation . . . should
be protected.”); Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO-Breach of Fiduciary Duty or
Business as Usual?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023, 2083–84 (2002) (suggesting that
default fiduciary duty rules should reflect what shareholders reasonably expect).
244 One problem with such nuanced expectations is what those expectations
actually are. Philip C. Sorensen, Discretion and Its Limits—An Analytical Framework for
Understanding and Applying the Duty of Care to Corporate Directors (and Others), 66
WASH. U. L. Q. 553, 584–85 (1988) (discussing that while the theoretical basis for the
duty of care is shareholder expectations, courts seem unwilling to revisit what those
expectations actually are, and are happy to stick with wealth maximization due to its
ease of application).
245 Bayne, supra note 17, at 579.
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in 2020, Pope Francis observed that, “in the effort to amass wealth,”
investors should avoid doing so through “exploitation.”246
Professor Santiago Mejia does important work on the theoretical
foundations of moral obligations transferring from shareholder to
director: at the same time that the director (agent) pursues profit on
behalf of the shareholder (principal), the director is bound by many,
but not all, of the shareholder’s moral obligations.247 That is to say,
many, but not all, of the shareholder’s moral obligations carry over to
the director.248 (This is a natural corollary to agency law that is often
overlooked by legal scholars.)
Professor Mejia created a two-part test for determining which
moral obligations “roll over” from shareholder to director: (1) it must
be a moral obligation implicated by the business the corporation is
engaged in; and (2) it must be a moral obligation that the shareholder
would want the director to discharge on her behalf.249 Professor
Mejia’s proposed framework is important because it requires
directors—consistent with shareholder duties (and expectations)—to
make decisions consistent with shareholders’ moral expectations.
B. A Different Decision-Making Process for The Board of Directors:
Multiple Ends Analysis
For the reasons listed above, a decision that implicates a
significant social policy issue is exactly the kind of decision where
shareholder expectations are likely to be more nuanced. Because
shareholder expectations are more nuanced, the ends in our meansends analysis must be more nuanced as well.
Returning to our hypothetical decision to build a power
generation plant, the board of directors will be required to build a
profitable plant while avoiding health and environmental harm. To
those, I add a third “nuance” to shareholders’ expectation of wealth
maximization: avoiding reputational harm.250
246 Pope Francis, Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to the Committee of Experts
from the European Council (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/
en/speeches/2020/october/documents/papa-francesco_20201008_comitatomoneyval.html.
247 Santiago Mejia, Weeding Out Flawed Versions of Shareholder Primacy: A
Reflection on the Moral Obligations that Carry Over from Principals to Agents, 29 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 519, 520 (2019).
248 Id.
249 Id. at 528.
250 Causes of action claiming that directors breached their fiduciary duty of care by
causing reputational harm to the corporation are not entirely unique. But previous
causes of action claiming reputational harm have been based on financial loss, not
violation of shareholder expectations. See generally Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040
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While the board of directors can examine profitability using
traditional business analysis,251 examining health, environmental
harm, and reputational harm requires policy analysis. I call the
combination of business analysis and policy analysis “Multiple Ends
Analysis.”252 The Multiple Ends Analysis process is illustrated in the
chart below.

Chart 4
Multiple Ends Analysis
(policy analysis components in bold italic)253
1Identify problem
1
2Specify ends
2

(this is a list of desirable
ends based on
shareholder expectations)

3Decide on criteria
3

(these criteria are used to
measure whether the
ends are met)

Corporation needs to produce more power to meet
demand
• Provide power
• Seek profitability
• Avoid harm to health and the
environment
• Avoid reputational harm
• Provide power: megawatts
• Seek profitability: dollars
• Avoid harm to health and the
environment: use both quantitative
and qualitative assessment techniques
• Avoid reputational harm: use both
quantitative and qualitative
assessment techniques

(2004); Cement-Lock v. Gas Tech. Inst., No. 05C0018, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83748, at
*27 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2007).
251 For a discussion of how business decision-makers decide whether to pursue a
project, see ASWATH DAMODARAN, APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 162–224 (2d ed. 2005)
(analyzing profitability of building a factory to produce linerboard). For a broader
explanation of business decision-making, see generally Earnest R. Archer, How to Make
a Business Decision: An Analysis of Theory and Practice, 69 MGMT. REV. 54, 55–59 (1980).
252 For an explanation of policy analysis, see Warren E. Walker, Policy Analysis: A
Systematic Approach to Supporting Policymaking in the Public Sector, 9 J. MULTI-CRITERIA
DECISION ANALYSIS 11, 14–18 (2000) (using an eight-step process).
253 This chart combines considerations used in a traditional profit analysis, see
DAMODARAN, supra note 251, with considerations used in public policy analysis. See id.
at 14–16.
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4Select alternatives

•
•
•
•
•
•

5Analyze alternatives

• Provide power: measure the output of
each alternative in megawatt
• Seek profitably: compare the costs
(building) to the future revenue (from
sale of power); use discounted cash flow
(“DCF”) analysis to bring future revenue
to present value
• Avoid harm to health and the
environment: can be measured
quantitatively (using damage cost
avoided, substitute cost),254 but also
requires qualitative tools, including
interviews and focus groups
• Avoid reputational harm: measure
reputational impact of each
alternative using qualitative tools,
including interviews and focus groups

4

5

[Vol. 52:59

(this involves doing the
actual measurement)

No new plant
Coal
Natural gas
Solar
Wind
Hydroelectric

6Compare alternatives

Compare how each of the alternatives meets each of the
ends. Compare tradeoffs to determine the best choice.

7

7Implement chosen
alternative

Build the power-generation facility that best meets the
ends (or if the decision was to stick with the status quo,
no power-generation facility).

8

8Monitor and evaluate
results

Is the new power-generation facility meeting the ends?
If not, the decision may have to be reexamined.

6

254 See Brent J. Horton, Terra Incognita: Applying the Entire Fairness Standard of
Review to Benefit Corporations, 22 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 842, 886–89 (2020) (discussing
possible methods for quantifying environmental harm).
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C. The Expertise Rationale for the Business Judgment Rule Applies
with Significantly Less Force When the Board is Applying
Multiple Ends Analysis
As we think about how a board of directors would conduct
Multiple Ends Analysis, it becomes clear that the board of directors will
have some (but not all) of the required expertise.
1. Expertise Regarding the First End: Seek Profitability
First, the board of directors will need to make sure the power
plant is profitable. On this issue the board does have superior
expertise for the many reasons discussed in Section II.B.
2. Expertise Regarding the Second End: Avoid Health and
Environmental Harm
The second end is avoiding harm to health and the environment.
Here, an analogy can be drawn to the case of the Netherlands deciding
whether it should build a new airport to meet increased demand and, if
so, where.255 Professor Warren E. Walker describes how he was
approached by the Dutch government to conduct a policy study, part of
which was estimating the relative safety of each option. Options
included the base case (i.e., doing nothing), or building a new airport in
a densely populated area, in a sparsely populated area, in the sea, in a
lake, or at the border.256
Professor Warren evaluated impacts on safety and natural
settings qualitatively.257 Likewise, in our power generation plant
hypothetical, we should estimate the effects on health and the
environment qualitatively (although quantitative estimates may
certainly play a role as well).
Qualitative analysis is important because some costs to health and
the environment are difficult to quantify.258 Not every impact can be
reduced to a number. For example, by interviewing those directly
affected by similar decisions (by this company or one of its
competitors), we can gain an understanding of the impact of similar
decisions.259 For example, if a competitor recently built a coal-fired
power plant, how did it impact community health? What was the
impact on the environment?
See Walker, supra note 252, at 19.
See id.
257 Id. at 15.
258 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (recognizing that
some benefits and costs are difficult to quantify).
259 Sara Sternberg Greene, The Bootstrap Trap, 67 DUKE L.J. 233, 242 (2017).
255
256
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Further, even where an impact to health or the environment can
be reduced to a number, “[b]y engaging intimately with individuals
directly affected by laws, policies, and systems, qualitative work adds
context and nuance to [those numbers].”260 That is why the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),261 which governs decision-making
by federal agencies,262 requires that government agencies evaluate the
environmental impact of a project in both quantitative and qualitative
terms.263 Specifically, the implementing regulation requires that when
the environmental impact statement includes a quantitative analysis, it
also must “discuss the relationship between that [quantitative]
analysis and any analyses of unquantified environmental impacts
. . . .”264
And here, a quick clarification may be in order: it is not my intent
to disparage directors as single-mindedly focused on money, or unable
to engage in qualitative analysis. Every year, business schools are
getting better at training them to do so.265 What I am saying is that
directors do not have any special expertise regarding qualitative
analysis of health or environmental harm. Deference to directors
regarding their assessment of health or environmental harm is not
justified by special expertise.

Kate Sablosky Elengold, The Investment Imperative, 57 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 26 (2019).
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1969) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70f).
262 I use the word “generally” because NEPA only applies to “major federal action.”
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); see Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 270 (8th Cir.
1980) (finding that private construction of power transmission line was not “major
federal action”). Under some circumstances, however, a private action may qualify as a
“major federal action” if “the project receives significant federal funding; [or where]
the federal agency must undertake ‘affirmative conduct’ before the non-federal actor
may act.” Mineral Pol’y Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2003); see
generally David J. Hayes & James A. Hourihan, NEPA Requirements for Private Projects,
13 B.C. ENV’T. AFF. L. REV. 61 (1985) (discussing problems that arise when privately
funded projects are found to involve “major federal action”).
263 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (requiring an “interdisciplinary approach”); see 40 C.F.R. §
1502.23 (2002) (requiring qualitative analysis); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg.
3821 (2011) (directing agencies to consider both quantitative and qualitative benefits
and costs when making regulatory decisions).
264 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (stating further, “[f]or purposes of complying with the Act,
the weighing of the merits and drawbacks of the various alternatives need not be
displayed in a monetary cost-benefit analysis and should not be when there are
important qualitative considerations”).
265 GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 67, at 7 (“In achieving its mission and vision,
AACSB emphasizes and models the values of quality, diversity and inclusion, a global
mindset, ethics, social responsibility, and community.”).
260
261
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3. Expertise Regarding the Third End: Avoid Reputational
Harm
The third end is protecting the corporation’s reputation. History
teaches us that directors are woefully inadequate at assessing harm to
their company’s reputation caused by controversial decisions. A
fascinating case study about this appears in Why Napalm is a
Cautionary Tale for Tech Giants.266 In that article, Kevin Roose
explains how Dow Chemical, which was widely known for household
goods like Saran Wrap, suddenly became known for napalm.267
Dow’s reputation was destroyed when it began to produce
napalm for the Pentagon during the Vietnam War.268 Dow became
associated with nightly news images of children with horrific napalm
burns.269 That reputational harm haunted Dow for decades.270 Roose
writes that “[Dow’s] marketing department was forced to embark on a
long and expensive campaign to win back the public’s trust.”271
It was a reputational harm that the Dow directors—for all their
training and experience—significantly underestimated.272 To the
extent that the directors did foresee reputational harm, they thought
about it in purely quantitative terms.273 They thought (wrongly) that
the harm would be proportionate to the napalm contract’s value, i.e.,
the reputational harm would be small because “napalm was a small
part of the company’s overall business.”274
Qualitative analysis—i.e., listening to early signs of opposition
through interviews and focus groups275—would have revealed to the
directors the kind of backlash they could expect.276 But qualitative
analysis is not directors’ expertise.277
As is the case with qualitative assessment of health and
environmental harm, directors do not have any special expertise
regarding qualitative analysis of reputational harm. Again, deference
266 See generally Kevin Roose, Why Napalm Is a Cautionary Tale for Tech Giants, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2019, at B1.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Roose, supra note 266, at B1.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Interviews and focus groups are classic qualitative methods. See generally
BILLUPS, supra note 5.
276 Roose, supra note 266, at B1.
277 See supra Section II.B.
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to directors regarding their assessment of reputational harm is not
justified by special expertise.
4. Information Gathering
Even where a decision implicates a significant social policy issue,
directors are more likely to ask for quantitative data to assist them in
the decision-making process (after all, ther is what they are most
comfortable with).278 Unfortunately—yet interestingly—one study
found that when subordinates report quantitative probability
assessments (as opposed to qualitative probability assessments) to
higher-ups, the probability assessments are more likely to turn out
wrong.279
That means that when a decision-maker asks for
quantitative assessments of future events—such as impacts on health
or the climate—they may be making the decision based on less
accurate information.280
Finally, even if directors did want qualitative data, they may have
difficulty accessing it. Pretend this was a problem that called only for
examination of the first end (making a profit). The board of directors
would have access to all the information necessary to conduct such an
analysis.281 For example, to determine the future net cash flows of a
project, the board of directors, as sovereign of the corporation, can
order management to provide them with the necessary information.282
As Professor Bainbridge points out in describing the board of directors
as a sovereign that has access to information by fiat, “[i]nformation
flows up a branching hierarchy to a central office.”283 Thereafter
“binding decisions flow back down.”284
The board, however, has no superior access to the qualitative data
necessary to evaluate health or environmental impacts. Directors
278 Even those who make policy for a living tend to believe that correct decisions
can be reached using “improved technical skills” and sometimes lose sight of the fact
that “[other c]ompetencies usually considered ‘softer’—imagination, judgment,
interpretive skills—are just as important.” See Walker, supra note 252, at 26.
279 Jeffrey A. Friedman, Jennifer S. Lerner & Richard Zeckhauser, Behavioral
Consequences of Probabilistic Precision: Experimental Evidence from National Security
Professionals, 71 INT’L ORG. 803, 817 (2017).
280 Id. at 817. Interestingly, the same study implied that decision-makers seem to
recognize that they are getting inaccurate (or at least misleading) information, and
compensate for it by seeking more information. Id. at 814–15.
281 Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 124.
282 The net income of current plants is already determined and aggregated for
purposes of preparing SEC filings. See Duke Energy Ohio, Inc., Annual Report (on Form
10-K), at 22 (March 12, 2010) (disclosing net income).
283 Bainbridge, supra note 26, at 124.
284 Id.
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(even if they are the sovereign of the corporation) cannot order
members of the local community to provide them with information.
They may have better luck with stakeholders with whom they have a
preexisting relationship—such as shareholders, suppliers, and
customers—but again, they do not have superior access that would
justify the sort of deference required by the business judgment rule.
5. Some Conclusions Regarding Expertise
In short, the board of directors may have superior expertise in
assessing the corporation’s ability to meet the first end, profitability.
But the board of directors does not have any superior expertise in
assessing the corporation’s ability to meet the second end, avoiding
health and environmental harm, or the third end, avoiding reputational
harm.
Further, assessing the second and third ends involves access to
information not readily at the fingertips of directors or the corporation
they lead.
Under such circumstances, the superior expertise
justification for the business judgment rule applies with less force, if at
all.
D. The Optimal Risk-Taking Rationale for the Business Judgment
Rule Applies with Significantly Less Force When Applying
Multiple Ends Analysis
The second rationale for the business judgment rule (and the
corresponding deference to director decisions) is that the rule
encourages optimal risk-taking by directors.285 Both shareholders and
broader society are willing to defer to director risk-taking based on the
assumption that the upside risk is greater than the downside risk.286
Shareholders consent to risk-taking by directors based on the
assumption that the corporate liability shield will limit their downside
risk (their loss is limited to their initial investment), as will portfolio
diversification.287
But neither a liability shield nor portfolio
diversification will protect a shareholder from risk to their health or
the environment.288
It is also doubtful that shareholders are willing to turn a blind eye
while the directors of the corporation they (the shareholders) have
See supra Section II.D.
See id.
287 See id.
288 Namrita Kapur, Investors Can’t Diversify Away from Climate Risk, FORBES (May 26,
2017, 10:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/edfenergyexchange/2017/05/26/
investors-cant-diversify-away-from-climate-risk/?sh=105dc30e49de.
285
286
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funded take risks with the health of others or the environment that
others enjoy. They will want to take an active role in such decisionmaking, thus undercutting any argument in favor of deference.
Society more broadly consents to director risk-taking because
most ordinary business decisions present very little downside risk.
For example, when “IBM . . . bet the company—spending more than the
cost of the Manhattan Project—to develop the IBM 360,”289 the worstcase scenario for society was an IBM bankruptcy, and a slight uptick in
the unemployment rate. But the downside risk for decisions that
implicate significant social policy issues is potentially greater. In the
case of our hypothetical, the downside risks include increased disease,
droughts and heat waves, and rising sea levels.290
V. PROPOSAL: THE SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL POLICY ISSUE EXCEPTION TO THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
If it is not appropriate to apply the business judgment rule to a
decision that implicates a significant social policy issue, then what
standard of review should the court apply? In Delaware, at first look,
there are two ends of the spectrum: the business judgment rule (which
we have ruled out) and entire fairness.291 But entire fairness also does
not seem appropriate, for two reasons. First, it is often outcome
determinative; it would be very difficult for a director decision to pass
scrutiny (that is to say, it swings the pendulum too far in the other
direction).292 Second, while the entire fairness test does examine fair
process, the emphasis is the fair price of a given transaction.293 Yet in
the significant social policy issue context, the shareholders’ concern is
not receiving a fair price for a transaction. Instead, their expectation is
that the decision will lead to profit while also not unduly harming the
environment or posing a threat to human rights.
Fortunately, Delaware courts have shown a willingness to adopt
standards of review between the extremes of business judgment and
Hu & Westbrook, supra note 136, at 1381.
The Effects of Climate Change, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
http://climate.nasa.gov/effects/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2021); see Jody Freeman &
Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1581
(2009) (discussing links between climate change and increased disease).
291 Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 821, 840 (2004).
292 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 795 (2006).
293 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (“[W]e recognize that
price may be the preponderant consideration outweighing other features of the
merger.”).
289
290
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entire fairness.294 This is especially true, as is the case here, where the
policy rationales for the business judgment rule apply with
significantly less force.
A. The Enhanced Scrutiny Test (And Why It Fits Here)
In the 1980s, there was a wave of hostile takeovers.295 The
corporate raider—e.g., Carl Icahn or T. Boone Pickins—would
purchase a company and then sell off its parts.296 In response, boards
of directors of target corporations began putting in place defensive
measures designed to fend off the raider (such as poison pills, lockups,
or stock repurchases).297
When corporate raiders challenged these defensive measures,
courts reviewed them under the very deferential business judgment
rule, which generally led to victory for the boards of directors
implementing the defensive measures.298 That changed (the standard,
not the outcome) with Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.299 In that case,
Pickins’ company, Mesa, engaged in a coercive two-tier “front loaded”
tender offer for Unocal’s shares at fifty-four dollars per share.300 In
response, the Unocal board approved a self-tender offer for the shares
at seventy-two dollars per share.301 (The self-tender offer would
require Unocal to take on a large amount of debt, making it less
attractive to the corporate raider.302)
Mesa challenged the defensive measures in court, arguing that the
board violated its fiduciary duties by, inter alia, approving the selftender offer.303 Conceptually, the Supreme Court of Delaware situated
the case somewhere between a duty of care case (requiring business

294 See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 597 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(“Avoiding a crude bifurcation of the world into two starkly divergent categories—
business judgment rule review reflecting a policy of maximal deference to
disinterested board decisionmaking and entire fairness review reflecting a policy of
extreme skepticism toward self-dealing decisions—the Delaware Supreme Court’s
Unocal and Revlon decisions adopted a middle ground.”).
295 John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986).
296 Id. at 3 (“[They] intend[] not to assimilate the target, but to dismantle it.”).
297 Id. at 6, 64 n.175.
298 Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984).
299 See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
300 Id. at 949.
301 Id. at 951.
302 Id. at 950 (“The cost of such a proposal would cause the company to incur $6.16.5 billion of additional debt.”).
303 Id. at 953.
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judgment deference) and a duty of loyalty case (requiring a showing of
entire fairness).304 The Court began by stating:
[in the takeover context] a board’s duty is no different from
any other responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions should
be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise would be
accorded in the realm of business judgment.305
The Court, however, went on to state a very important caveat:
We must bear in mind the inherent danger in the purchase of
shares with corporate funds to remove a threat to corporate
policy when a threat to control is involved. The directors are
of necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an
objective decision is difficult.306
So, the Court concluded:
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting primarily in its own interests [to entrench itself], . . .
there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial
examination at the threshold before the protections of the
business judgment rule may be conferred.307
The above referenced enhanced judicial examination has two
parts.308 It requires that the directors show (i) that they undertook a
reasonable investigation, and (ii) that the chosen defensive mechanism
was reasonable in relation to the threat posed.309 The Court held that
the Unocal board met its burden by reaching the well-supported
conclusion that the Mesa offer was inadequate, and that the self-tender
offer was a proportionate response.310 (It must be emphasized that
Unocal, in addition to rejecting business judgment deference, placed
the initial burden of proof on the board of directors to “at minimum
convince the court that they have not acted for an inequitable
purpose.”311)
Why should the intermediate standard of enhanced scrutiny be
used (or modified for use) in the context of decisions that implicate a
significant social policy issue? In Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,
the Court of Chancery decided that the business judgment rule should
be replaced with the intermediate standard of enhanced scrutiny when

304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311

Id. at 954–55.
Unocal, 493 A.2d. at 954.
Id. at 955.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 958–59.
Id.
Id.
Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 807 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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public policy requires it.312 In Blasius, protecting the sanctity of the
shareholder vote outweighed traditional public policies in favor of
application of the business judgment rule.313 (The corporation tried to
argue that “packing” the board of directors was a valid exercise of
business judgment.314) Likewise, where a decision implicates a
significant social policy issue, rationales in favor of enhanced scrutiny
(shareholder input regarding policy issues) are strong,315 while
rationales in favor of the business judgment rule (i.e., deference to
expertise and encouraging risk-taking) apply with significantly less
force.316
Second, plaintiffs challenging a decision that implicates a
significant social policy issue will not be seeking monetary damages.
They will be seeking a change in the decision itself, usually in the form
of injunctive relief. As commentators have pointed out, “courts apply
enhanced scrutiny liberally in actions for injunctive relief . . . .”317
Third, even if the action does not result in an injunction, the fact
that the court applies enhanced scrutiny requires the board to
communicate to the court (and thus, the shareholders) the information
it relied on to make the decision and why that decision fits within a
range of reasonable alternatives, enhancing the credibility of the
decision.318 As mentioned in the Introduction, this prevents the board
of directors from bypassing shareholder input when making decisions
regarding important policy matters (such as decisions that implicate
climate change; human rights, including forced- or child-labor and free
speech; or indiscriminate weapons).319

Blasius Indus, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659–60 (Del. Ch. 1988) (finding
that the business judgment rule should not be applied where “ordinary considerations
to which the business judgment rule originally responded are simply not present
. . . .”); see Velasco, supra note 291, at 840 (suggesting the use of a middle-ground test
where the decision is plagued by structural bias).
313 Blasius, 564 A.2d. at 659–60.
314 Id. at 657–58.
315 See supra Section IV.A (discussing a shareholder’s duty to make sure the board
uses their (the shareholder’s) investment morally).
316 See supra Sections IV.C, IV.D.
317 Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 519, 522
(2009); see Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015) (“Unocal
and Revlon are primarily designed to give stockholders and the Court of Chancery the
tool of injunctive relief to address important M & A decisions in real time, before
closing.”).
318 Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1993).
319 Id.
312
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B. Modifying the Enhanced Scrutiny Test for Board Decisions that
Implicate a Significant Social Policy Issue
For our purposes, a slightly different formulation of the enhanced
scrutiny test is appropriate (as compared to the version used in the
defensive measures context). First, the shareholder challenging the
decision must show that the decision implicates a significant social
policy issue. Thereafter, the burden would shift to the board of
directors to demonstrate (1) the reasonableness of “the
decisionmaking process employed by the directors, including the
information on which the directors based their decision;” and (2) “the
reasonableness of the directors’ action in light of the circumstances
then existing.”320
In judging the second prong, the court should show some
deference (albeit not to the level of business judgment deference) to
the reasonableness of the decision itself. As the Delaware Supreme
Court in Paramount Communications v. QVC Network wrote: “[A] court
applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be deciding whether the
directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision.”321 If the
board chose “one of several reasonable alternatives” the court should
not grant the injunction.322 A visualization of this modified enhanced
scrutiny test is provided below.
Chart 5.
How Proposal Fits Within Current Legal Framework

320
321
322

Id.
Id.
Id.
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How would the modified enhanced scrutiny test apply to our
hypothetical scenario? If the board decides to build a coal-fired power
plant (or gas-fired power plant, or any other kind of power plant that
the shareholder plaintiff believes contributes to climate change), the
shareholder plaintiff would bring a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the
construction. The shareholder plaintiff must show that building a coalfired power generation plant implicates a significant social policy issue.
If they are successful, the burden would then shift to the board of
directors to show that it engaged in a reasonable decision-making
process, and that the board acted reasonably considering the
circumstances then existing.
1. Plaintiff Shareholders Have the Initial Burden
The reality is that “significant social policy issue” is hard to define.
Fortunately, we can borrow from 14a-8 case law and SEC no-action
letters.323 If a matter falls into one of the specified categories—or is
significantly like a matter that falls into one of the categories—it is a
“significant social policy issue.” (There is precedent for using a
category approach; it is akin to the “family resemblance” used by
securities lawyers to determine when notes are securities.324) In Part
III above, I pointed out many categories that are considered significant
social policy issues, including human rights, indiscriminate weapons,
and decisions to build power generation plants (implicating climate
change).
Returning to our hypothetical scenario, what would the plaintiff
shareholders need to show to shift the burden to the board of
directors?
a. The plaintiff shareholders must identify (i) the decision
being made by the board of directors, and (ii) the implicated
significant social policy issue. Here, the decision is what kind
of power generation plant to build, and the significant social
policy issue is climate change.
b. The plaintiff must show a connection between the two. A
foreseeability analysis seems appropriate.325
Can the
decision-maker foresee the decision implicating the

See supra Part III.
See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64–65 (1990) (adopting the family
resemblance test).
325 Foreseeability is one of the most adaptable tools in legal analysis.
See
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1569, 1594–1600 (2009) (discussing the many applications of foreseeability).
323
324
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significant social policy issue?326 Here, one can foresee that
the decision to build a power generation plant would
implicate climate change.
c. The plaintiff shareholders must show that the social policy
issue in question is indeed significant. Here, as discussed in
Part III above, they could rely on what various federal courts
and SEC staff have indicated is significant. Here, there is a
plethora of no-action letters holding that climate change is a
significant social policy issue.
2. The Burden Shifts to the Board of Directors
Once the burden of proof shifts to the board of directors, the first
thing that the directors will need to establish is “the adequacy of the
decision-making process employed . . . including the information on
which [they] based their decision.”327 Because the matter implicates a
significant social policy issue, the board should show that they
considered ends in addition to profit maximization. For the reasons
discussed in Section IV.B above, these ends would include avoiding
harm to health and the environment and avoiding reputational harm.
By way of example, as to the last end, the board of directors could
review any number of studies regarding how each type of power
generation plant impacts climate change.328 They would learn that
coal-fired plants release 210.20 pounds of carbon dioxide per million
British thermal units (“Btu”) produced, and natural gas-fired plants
release 117 pounds of carbon dioxide per million Btu produced.329 On
the other hand, solar, wind, and hydroelectric are not significant
sources of carbon dioxide.330
326 The dictionary definition of “implicate” is “to entwine in or with.” Implicate, v.,
OED Online (Oxford University Press 2020), https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
92475?rskey=0EVSqI&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid.
327 Paramount, 637 A.2d at 45.
328 ENVIRONMENT BASELINE, supra note 175, at 4 (breaking down carbon dioxide
emissions by power plant type). In addition, the directors should review how the
choice of power plant impacts human health. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Levy, Lisa K. Baxter
& Joel Schwartz, Uncertainty and Variability in Health-Related Damages from Coal-Fired
Power Plants in the United States, 29 RISK ANALYSIS 1000 (2009); Muzhe Yang & Shin-Yi
Chou, The Impact of Environmental Regulation on Fetal Health: Evidence from the
Shutdown of a Coal-Fired Power Plant Located Upwind of New Jersey, 90 J. ENV’T ECON. &
MGMT. 269 (2018); Julia Kravchenko & H. Kim Lyerly, The Impact of Coal-Powered
Electrical Plants and Coal Ash Impoundments on the Health of Residential Communities,
79 N.C. MED. J. 289 (2018).
329 ENVIRONMENT BASELINE, supra note 175, at 4.
330 Carbon Dioxide Emissions Coefficients, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 14, 2013),
https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/co2_vol_mass.php.
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As discussed in Section IV.C above, however, the board of
directors should supplement any quantitative data with qualitative
data to gain a deeper understanding of how their decision will impact
the world. This can be accomplished with any number of qualitative
tools, including interviews or case studies. The directors do not need
to conduct such studies themselves (although they can); they may
incorporate existing studies into the decision-making process. 331
The final prong requires the directors to establish “the
reasonableness of [their] action in light of the circumstances then
existing.”332 Here, as stated in Paramount, the court should show some
deference: it should simply ask if the board chose “one of several
reasonable alternatives.”333
In our example, while a coal-fired power generation plant may
produce the most carbon dioxide, it may still be a reasonable
alternative (even the most reasonable alternative). Let me illustrate:
in 2013 the University of Alaska at Fairbanks (“UAF”) faced a
problem.334 Its existing coal-fired power generation plant, built in
1964, was reaching the end of its fifty-year life span.335 It was
beginning to fail, and the University feared that the next breakdown
could be catastrophic (Fairbanks winter temperatures can drop to
minus-sixty degrees Fahrenheit).336 Pipes would freeze, causing
331 The President’s Council on Environmental Quality suggests that “qualitative . . .
discussion of the impacts of GHG emissions [can be] based on authoritative reports
such as the USGCRP’s National Climate Assessments . . . .” Memorandum from
Christina Goldfuss, Chair, Council on Env’t Quality, to the Heads of Fed. Dep’ts &
Agencies 10 (Aug. 1, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/documents/nepa_final_ghg_guidance.pdf (citing U.S. GLOBAL
CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL REPORT, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT, Volume I (2017)). Many utilities have already begun to conduct or
participate in qualitative studies of how their own infrastructure may be impacted by
climate change. See U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, A REVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENTS: CURRENT PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM DOE’S PARTNERSHIP FOR ENERGY
SECTOR CLIMATE RESILIENCE 15 (2016) (“For example, a qualitative risk assessment may
examine generally how extreme weather events impacted transmission and
distribution systems in the past or how future scenarios of climate change may impact
different types of assets.”).
332 Paramount, 637 A.2d at 45.
333 Id.
334 See Tegan Hanlon, UAF Coal-Fired Plant Briefly Knocked Offline, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 30, 2013, at A4.
335 Id.
336 See Univ. of Alaska Fairbanks, Combined Heat and Power Plant: Project
Background,
https://www.uaf.edu/heatandpower/background.php
[hereinafter
Project Background] (discussing the impact of plant failure to university finances and
infrastructure); Tim Bradner, UAF Needs $200M Power Plant Replacement, Sooner
Rather Than Later, ALASKA J. COM. (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.alaskajournal.com/
business-and-finance/2012-08-31/uaf-needs-200m-power-plant-replacement-
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hundreds of millions of dollars of damage.337 The University (which
ironically conducts a great deal of climate change research) could be
required to close.338
The decision-makers at UAF looked at several possible alternative
solutions, including coal, natural gas, solar, wind, and hydroelectric;
they even looked at a small nuclear reactor.339 But they chose a coalfired power generation plant.340 Natural gas would be cleaner, but
natural gas is simply not available in Fairbanks.341 Even if they could
truck it in, it would cost three times more than coal.342
Of course, solar, wind, or hydroelectric would be cleaner, but they
were all non-starters. As to solar, in the dead of winter, Fairbanks only
gets three to four hours of sunlight a day.343 As to wind, “[t]he wind
doesn’t blow much in Fairbanks.”344 They looked into hydroelectric,
but that would depend on the construction of the Watana dam on the
Susitna River.345 The dam was facing opposition, and even if it was
constructed, it wouldn’t be in operation until 2022.346 A small nuclear
reactor would have been tied up in regulatory approvals for years.347

sooner-rather-later (discussing extremely low temperatures in Fairbanks and how
failure of power and heat plants would be catastrophic).
337 Project Background, supra note 336.
338 Id.
339 Joe Ryan Bloomberg, University of Alaska Opens First New US Coal-Fired Power
Plant in Years, CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL, Feb. 12, 2019, at P6A; see Project Background,
supra note 336 (click on “Did You Look At Other Options” under FAQs).
340 Bloomberg, supra note 339, at P6A.
341 Id. (“The oil and gas fields of the state’s North slope are 500 miles north. The
nearest major port is in Anchorage, 350 miles south.”).
342 See Matt Buxton, UAF Chancellor Says Replacing Power Plant Worth the High
Pricetag, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.newsminer.com/
news/local_news/uaf-chancellor-says-replacing-power-plant-worth-the-highpricetag/article_52be2b84-9943-11e3-92dc-001a4bcf6878.html.
343 See Bloomberg, supra note 339, at P6A; Explore Fairbanks, What Winter Solstice
Looks Like in Fairbanks, Alaska, EXPLORE FAIRBANKS ALASKA (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.explorefairbanks.com/blog/post/winter-solstice-fairbanks-alaska/ (“On
the shortest day of the year – December 21st this year – Fairbanks will have about 3hrs
41mins when the sun is up.”).
344 Bradner, supra note 336.
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 See New Coal-Fired Plant to Replace Old Boilers at UAF, THE N. LIGHT, UNIV. ALASKA
– ANCHORAGE, Sept. 17, 2017 (“[W]e even looked at a nuclear option but that didn’t
work out so well.”); Ravenna Koenig, In Interior Alaska, Reinvestment in Coal Power
Runs Counter to National Trend, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.newsminer.com/news/alaska_news/in-interior-alaska-reinvestment-incoal-power-runs-counter-to-national-trend/article_dcd3fbee-d0a4-11e8-aeeae7683304c41c.html (“I didn’t particularly want to go with nuclear.”).
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The decision, while difficult, was made somewhat easier by the
fact that the new “cleaner” coal boilers would reduce particulates by 50
percent.348 While carbon dioxide emissions would only be reduced by
3 percent, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides (that together cause acid
rain) are reduced by 60 and 64 percent, respectively.349
Of course, what is “one of several reasonable alternatives” may be
very different in another geographic location. For example, in the
southern United States, like southern California and Arizona, which
receive more sunlight and less cloud cover. There, solar might be the
most reasonable alternative.
VI. CONCLUSION
The business judgment rule is judge-made law.350 It requires that
judges defer to business decisions made by a board of directors.351 The
first justification for the rule is that judges are not business experts.352
The second justification is that judges are hesitant to second-guess
risk-taking on the part of the board of directors—because such risktaking accrues to the benefit of shareholders (and even society more
broadly).353
However, as judge-made law, the business judgment rule is
subject to judge-made exceptions. For example, courts will get
involved where (1) the directors have engaged in fraud; (2) it is shown
that the directors have engaged in self-dealing, or their loyalty is
otherwise called into question; or (3) the decision-making process was
grossly negligent.354 I propose to add the following to this list of
exceptions: (4) the decision implicates a significant social policy
issue.355 Where the significant social policy issue exception is
triggered, the directors must show (1) the reasonableness of the
decision-making process employed, and (2) that they chose one of
several reasonable alternatives.356
The reason for my proposed additional exception is
straightforward: the traditional justifications for judicial deference to
348 Conditions Attached to University of Alaska Fairbanks Power Plant, ALASKA J. COM.
(May 8, 2014), https://www.alaskajournal.com/business-and-finance/2014-05-08/
conditions-attached-ua-power-plant-railroad-funding.
349 Project Background, supra note 336.
350 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981).
351 See supra Section II.A.
352 See supra Section II.B.
353 See supra Sections II.C, II.D.
354 See supra Section II.A.
355 See supra Part V.
356 See supra Section V.B.
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the board of directors (such as the board’s expertise or encouraging
optimal risk-taking) apply with significantly less force, if at all, to
decisions that implicate significant social policy issues.357 While such
decisions still call for quantitative analysis of profitability, they also
call for qualitative analysis of impacts on such matters as health and
environment, or human rights.358 While directors may have special
expertise with regard to quantitative analysis, they do not have any
special expertise with regard to qualitative analysis that justify judicial
deference.359
Turning to optimal risk-taking, shareholders defer to directors’
assessments of risk based upon the assumption that their downside
risk is limited and financial in nature.360 But risks raised by significant
social policy issues (like climate change or human rights violations)
cannot be diversified away,361 nor are they purely financial.362
Further, an analogous area of law—exclusion of shareholder
proposals as interfering with ordinary business operations of the
corporation—has an exception to the exclusion for significant social
policy issues.363 Shareholders cannot be prevented from submitting
proposals that implicate climate change, human rights (forced- or
child-labor), or indiscriminate weapons.364 It seems odd that a similar
exception has not evolved in the area of business judgment rule
jurisprudence, especially considering that, in reverse, the ordinary
business operations exclusion evolved as an attempt to ensure that
shareholder proposals were not used to end-run the business
judgment rule.365

See supra Part IV.
See supra Section IV.C.
359 See supra Section IV.C.
360 See supra Section II.D.
361 See supra Section IV.D.
362 See supra Section IV.D.
363 See supra Section III.A.
364 See supra Sections III.B, C, D.
365 Rule 14a-8’s ordinary business exclusion evolved from the business judgment
rule itself. Here, the SEC response to a question posed by Senator Herbert H. Lehman
in 1956 are instructive:
Question: How does the Commission determine whether a proposal
made by a stockholder under rule 14a-8 relates to the ordinary business
operations of the issuer?
Answer: The policy motivating the Commission in adopting the
[ordinary business exclusion] is basically the same as the underlying
policy of most State corporation laws to confine the solution of ordinary
business problems to the board of directors . . . . The basic reason for
this policy [i.e., the business judgment rule] is that it is manifestly
357
358

HORTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

10/28/21 4:09 PM

“SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL POLICY ISSUE” EXCEPTION

117

Finally, my proposal allows shareholders to force their way back
into the corporate decision-making process, albeit through litigation.
This is especially important when we consider that shareholders have
been locked out of less “confrontational” means of influencing
corporate behavior, such as the process for nominating directors
(shareholders can vote for directors, but the vote is for a preordained
slate of directors).366 In closing, there is something especially
disturbing about not allowing shareholders—who are the true owners
of the corporation—to challenge board decisions regarding important
policy matters,367 such as decisions that implicate climate change,
human rights, or indiscriminate weapons. This proposal remedies that
problem.

impracticable in most cases for stockholders to decide management
problems at corporate meetings.
Hearings on SEC Enforcement Problems before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 118 (1957) (statement of SEC
Chairman J. Sinclair Armstrong). In fact, the same SEC written responses explain that
in deciding whether a matter is properly excludable, it must “examine[] the law of the
state of incorporation to determine whether there is any statute or case law defining
what is meant by the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the company.” Id.;
see also Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4979, 1954
SEC LEXIS 38, *3 (Jan. 6, 1954) (declaring that state law governs ordinary business
exclusion).
366 Roiter, supra note 15, at 52–53.
367 Matheson & Olson, supra note 13, at 1458–59.

